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IS "INTERNAL CONSISTENCY" FOOLISH?:
REFLECTIONS ON AN EMERGING
COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINT ON
STATE TAXATION
Walter Hellerstein *

Before 1983, the Supreme Court had never uttered the phrase "internal consistency" in a state tax opinion. 1 Since 1983, however, the
Court has invoked the principle of "internal consistency" on four separate occasions in adjudicating the validity of state taxes under the
commerce clause. 2 Indeed, by 1987, the Court could refer almost casually to the "internal consistency" criterion as "the test . . . we have
applied in other contexts."3 The Court's talk of "internal consistency"
cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric. Three of the four taxes that
have been put to the "internal consistency" test have flunked it; 4 cases
approving taxes that, in retrospect, would have failed the test have
been overruled;5 and the test has cast a constitutional shadow over
many other taxes. 6 In the eyes of some members of the Court, moreover, general application of the "internal consistency" doctrine as a
tool of commerce clause analysis is "an entirely novel enterprise" 7 that
would "revolutionize the law of state taxation." 8
Whatever role "internal consistency" may come to play in the
Court's commerce clause jurisprudence, it has already emerged as a
doctrine that warrants our attention. This article traces the develop* Professor of Law, University of Georgia; A.B., Harvard, 1967; J.D., University of Chi·
cago, 1970.-Ed. I am deeply indebted to Donald Regan for his detailed and illuminating critique of an earlier draft of this article; I am grateful as well to Milner Ball, Andrew Frey, Paul
Kurtz, James Smith, Michael Wells, and Prentiss Willson, Jr., for their helpful comments.
1. The assertion is based on a LEXIS search of Supreme Court opinions for the phrase "internal consistency."
2. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2840 (1987); Tyler Pipe Indus. v.
Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2820 (1987); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S.
638, 644-45 (1984); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
3. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2840.
4. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829; Tyler-Pipe, 107 S. Ct. 2810; Armco, 467 U.S. 638.
5. See Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2845-47 (overruling Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339
U.S. 542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Commrs., 332 U.S. 495 (1947);
Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commn., 295 U.S. 285 (1935)); Tyler Pipe,
107 S. Ct. at 2820 (overruling General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964)).
6. See text at notes 86-136 infra.
7. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2850 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8. .Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2825 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ment of the doctrine, explores its implications, and considers its defensibility as a limitation on state taxing power.. The article suggests that
the results the Court reaches under the "internal consistency" doctrine
could be reached by rigorous application of a more familiar commerce
clause principle - one to which the Court has been less than faithful.
I.

A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "INTERNAL
CONSISTENCY" DOCTRINE

Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board

The Supreme Court first suggested that the principle of "internal
consistency" constrained state taxing power in Container Corporation
of America v. Franchise Tax Board. 9 In discussing the constitutional
limitations on the states' power to tax the income of a multistate business, the Court observed that the due process and commerce clauses
require the states to be "fair" 10 in applying apportionment formulas to
determine how much of the enterprise's income they may tax. The
Court then declared: "The first, and ... obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal
consistency - that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by
every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary
business' income being taxed."11
Read in context, the Court's statement was unexceptional. The
Court has long interpreted the commerce and due process clauses as
requiring that taxes be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in
the taxing state. 12 The fair apportionment requirement serves the
function, among others, of implementing the commerce clause prohibition against multiple taxation of interstate commerce. 13 If a tax is
9. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
10. 463 U.S. at 169.
11. 463 U.S. at 169. Wholly apart from the question of the intrinsic fairness of an apportionment formula, a formula, though "internally consistent," may be unfair to a particular multistate
taxpayer because it effectively taxes extraterritorial values. In Container, the Court characterized
this second aspect of the fairness of an apportionment formula as the requirement of "external
consistency - the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a
reasonable sense of how income is generated." 463 U.S. at 169.
12. See, e.g., Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891) (commerce
clause); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 281-83 (1919) (due process clause).
13. The multiple taxation doctrine forbids the states from imposing taxes that subject interstate commerce to a risk of multiple taxation not borne by local commerce. See Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1938); J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN,
STATE AND LoCAL TAXATION 219-21 (5th ed. 1988); text at notes 149-72 infra. As Justice
Rutledge articulated the doctrine in his concurring opinion in International Harvester Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 358 (1944):
fl1he state may not impose certain taxes on interstate commerce, its incidents or instrumentalities, which are no more in amount or burden than it places on its local business, not
because this of itself is discriminatory, cumulative or special or would violate due process,
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fairly apportioned to a taxpayer's activities in the state, there is no
risk, at least in principle, that it will violate the multiple taxation doctrine by subjecting interstate commerce to a multiple tax burden not
borne by local commerce.
Despite this general rule against multiple taxation, the Court has
been quite tolerant in permitting the states to adopt apportionment
formulas of their own choosing, even though the adoption of varying
formulas by different states may in fact subject the interstate business
to multiple taxation. 14 So long as a state's formula is intrinsically fair,
it is not constitutionally infirm merely because the adoption by a sister
state of another intrinsically fair formula could create "some overlap"15 in taxation. The explanation for this exception to the commerce clause prohibition against multiple taxation lies in the Court's
inability to determine which of the two competing formulas is "at fault
in a constitutional sense" 16 without prescribing uniform rules of apportionment among the states. The Court recognized that "the legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of income."17
But the Court ha8 declined to undertake that task itself because it believes that it is neither institutionally equipped nor constitutionally authorized to do so.
The leeway the Court has accorded the states to design their own
apportionment formulas, however, does not extend to formulas that, if
adopted generally, will inevitably subject a multistate enterprise to
multiple taxation. A formula ceases to be intrinsically fair when, if
applied across all taxing states, it subjects a multistate enterprise to
taxation of more than 100% of its tax base. 18 This is because the doctrine of intrinsic fairness requires equity to the taxpayer whose tax
base happens to be taxable in part by several states rather than in
but because other states also may have the right constitutionally, apart from the commerce
clause, to tax the same thing and either the actuality or the risk of their doing so makes the
total burden cumulative, discriminatory or special.
14. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation: Purposeful Economic Protectionism and Beyond, 85 MICH. L. REV.
758, 763-66 (1987).
15. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 277.
16. 437 U.S. at 277.
17. 437 U.S. at 280.
18. This assumes, of course, that the intrastate business is subject to a tax on only 100% of
its tax base. The unfairness of formulas that inevitably tax the interstate business on more than
100% of its tax base is that they expose the interstate business to greater tax burdens than those
borne by its intrastate competitor. A tax that subjected every business, interstate and intrastate
alike, to an exaction on 150 or 200% ofits appropriate tax base would not be intrinsically unfair,
just somewhat bizarre.
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whole by a single state. Thus, for taxes to be intrinsically fair, the sum
of the taxes derived from the parts may not exceed the taxes derived
from the whole. Adventitious multiple taxation arising from the interaction of two inconsistent, but intrinsically fair, apportionment formulas may be the price we pay for federalism. Predictable multiple
taxation arising from the generalized application of a single, intrinsically unfair, apportionment formula is a price we need not pay.
The Court's reference to "internal consistency" in Container appeared simply to remind us of this point. In fact, the Court made no
further reference to the "internal consistency" criterion in its opinion,
which was largely devoted to its analysis sustaining the application of
California's widely accepted (and "internally consistent") three-factor
apportionment formula to the taxpayer's worldwide combined income.19 One would have been prescient indeed to detect the birth of a
new principle of commerce clause jurisprudence in the Court's brief
description of an "obvious[ ] component of fairness in
apportionment formula."20

an

B.

Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty

Less than a year after Container, the Court attributed broader significance to the "internal consistency" doctrine in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty. 21 In Armco, the Court considered a claim of state tax
discrimination under West Virginia's business and occupation (B & 0)
tax. 22 The B & 0 tax was a broad-based excise upon the privilege of
engaging in most business activity in the state, including manufacturing and wholesaling. The tax was measured by gross business receipts.
In general, if a taxpayer engaged in two different business activities, it
paid a tax upon the privilege of engaging in each activity. A "multiple
activities" exemption, however, relieved manufacturers subject to the
manufacturing tax from liability for the wholesaling tax. The manufacturing tax was imposed at a higher rate than the wholesaling tax.
19. The most widely accepted formula for apportioning the income of a multijurisdictional
business among the states employs three factors: real and tangible personal property, payroll,
and sales. By averaging the ratios of the taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales within the state
to its property, payroll, and sales throughout the business, the formula yields a fraction that can
be applied to the taxpayer's net income to determine the portion taxable by the state. In
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983), the Court described the
three-factor formula as "something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas
are judged." 463 U.S. at 170. See generally Hellerstein, State Income Taxation ofMultijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113 (1980)
[hereinafter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation].
20. Container, 463 U.S. at 169.
21. 467 U.S. 638 (1984).
22. 1971 W. Va. Acts 169 (repealed effective July 1, 1987). See Armco, 467 U.S. at 640 n.2.
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Armco, an Ohio manufacturer engaged in wholesaling in West
Virginia, charged that the levy discriminated against interstate commerce because it taxed out-of-state manufacturers who sold at wholesale in the state, while exempting in-state manufacturers who sold at
wholesale in the state. The Supreme Court agreed that the tax on its
face discriminated against interstate commerce.23 The existence of a
higher B & 0 tax on in-state manufacturers did not cure the discrimination because the manufacturing.tax could not be viewed as substantially equivalent to the wholesaling tax. 24 Furthermore, and most
importantly from the standpoint of the present inquiry, the Court rejected the state's contention that Armco had "to prove actual discriminatory impact on it by pointing to a State that imposes a
manufacturing tax that results in a total burden higher than that imposed on Armco's competitors in West Virginia." 25
This is not the test. In Container ... the Court noted that a tax must
have "what might be called internal consistency - that is the [tax] must
be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction," there would be no impermissible interference with free trade. In that case, the Court was discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned to reflect the
business conducted in the State. A similar rule applies where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce.
A tax that unfairly apportions income from other States is a form of
discrimination against interstate commerce.... Any other rule would
mean that the constitutionality of West Virginia's tax laws would depend
on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States, and that
the validity of the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the
particular other States in which it operated. 26

West Virginia's tax plainly failed the "internal consistency" test.
If every state imposed a tax like West Virginia's, the enterprise that

manufactured in one state and wholesaled in another would pay a
manufacturing tax to the state of manufacture and a wholesaling tax
to the state of sale. Due to the levy's "multiple activities" exemption,
however, the wholly intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler would pay a
tax only on its manufacturing activity. Hence, the scheme would
place the interstate manufacturer/wholesaler at a competitive disadvantage to the intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler by saddling the former with a multiple tax burden not borne by the latter and would thus
23. Armco, 467 U.S. at 642.
24. 467 U.S. at 642-43. See generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405 (1986) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Com-

plementary Taxes].
25. Armco, 467 U.S. at 644.
26. 467 U.S. at 644-45 (citation omitted).
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create an "impermissible interference with free trade." 27
The Court's extension of the "internal consistency" .test to questions beyond the intrinsic fairness of a state's apportionment formula
did not escape tP,e attention of Justice Rehnquist. He vigorously objected to the Court's focus on hypothetical tax burdens borne by the
interstate business, observing that the Court's prior decisions indicated
"that when considering whether a tax is discriminatory, 'equality for
the purposes of competition and the flow of commerce is measured in
dollars and cents, not legal abstractions.' " 28 Armco in fact had paid
no manufacturing tax to Ohio, so there was no actual discrimination
in the case. The Court, according to Justice Rehnquist, "sidestepped"
this fact by
borrowing a concept employed in our net income tax cases. Under that
line of cases a state tax must have an internal consistency that takes into
consideration the impact on interstate commerce if other jurisdictions
employed the same tax. It is perfectly proper to examine a State's net
income tax system for hypothetical burdens on interstate commerce.
Nevertheless, that form of analysis is irrelevant to examining the validity
of a gross receipts tax system based on manufacturing or wholesale
transactions. Where a State's taxes are linked exactly to the activities
taxed, it should be unnecessary to examine a hypothetical taxing scheme
to see if interstate commerce would be unduly burdened. 29
Justice Rehnquist would thus have sustained West Virginia's B & 0

tax, despite its internal inconsistency, because of his view that "internal consistency" analysis should play no role outside the specific context in which it was first invoked.
C. Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington Department of Revenue
Three years after addressing the challenge to West Virginia's B &
0 tax in Armco, the Court revisited the "internal consistency" doctrine in addressing a similar challenge to Washington's B & 0 tax in
Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington Department of Revenue. 30 Like
West Virginia, Washington_ imposed its B & 0 tax on gross receipts
from various business activities carried on in the state, including manufacturing and wholesaling. Like West Virginia, Washington had a
"multiple activities" exemption, which assured that taxpayers engaged
in both manufacturing and wholesaling in the state would pay tax on
only one activity. But, instead of exempting local manufacturer/
27. 467 U.S. at 644.
28. 467 U.S. at 647 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.
v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963)).
29. 467 U.S. at 648 (citation omitted).
30. 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987).
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wholesalers from the state's wholesaling tax, as West Virginia had
done, Washington exempted them from the state's manufacturing tax.
In so doing, Washington avoided the particular problem of facial discrimination the Court had identified in Armco. Out-of-state manufacturers who made wholesale sales in Washington would pay the same
tax on their wholesaling activities as their Washington-based competitors who manufactured and wholesaled their products in the state. 31
In the Court's view, however, the fact that both out-of-state and
local manufacturers paid the same wholesaling tax under Washington's B & 0 tax did not cure the constitutional defect in Washington's
tax. Judged by the standard of "internal consistency," Washington's
levy was as constitutionally infirm as West Virginia's. Just as the interstate manufacturer/wholesaler in Armco was put at a competitive
disadvantage to the intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler on the assumption that every state had adopted West Virginia's taxing scheme,
so the same disadvantage would exist in Tyler Pipe on the assumption
that every state had adopted Washington's taxing scheme. In each
instance, the interstate manufacturer/wholesaler would pay both a
manufacturing tax to the state of manufacture and a wholesaling tax
to the state of sale, whereas the intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler
would pay but one tax-. a manufacturing tax under West Virginia's
statute or a wholesaling tax under Washington's. In short, the Court's
conclusion that Washington's taxing scheme was the "practical
equivalent"32 of West Virginia's, from the standpoint of "internal consistency," was inescapable.33
31. While avoiding facial discrimination against the out-of-state manufacturer making in·
state sales, Washington's scheme introduced a different form of facial discrimination against the
local manufacturer making out-of-state sales. Local manufacturers making out-of-state sales
paid a manufacturing tax whereas local manufacturers making in-state sales did not. Although
the discrimination arguably disappeared if one considered that local manufacturers making instate sales paid a tax on their in-state sales activity equal to the tax that local manufacturers
making out-of-state sales paid on their local manufacturing activity, a similar point was made,
and rejected, in Armco with respect to the manufacturing tax paid by local manufacturer/wholesalers. See text at note 24 supra; Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2816-19.
32. 107 S. Ct. at 2817.
33. Even though it struck down Washington's B & 0 tax as applied to interstate manufacturer/wholesalers, the Court in Tyler Pipe did suggest two alternatives for curing the constitutional defects in the statutory scheme by "eliminating exposure to the burden of a multiple tax on
manufacturing and wholesaling." 107 S. Ct. at 2819. First, the state could provide a credit
against Washington manufacturing tax liability for wholesale taxes paid by Washington manufacturers to any state, 107 S. Ct. at 2819-20, and a credit against Washington wholesale tax
liability for manufacturing taxes paid by out-of-state manufacturers to other states. 107 S. Ct. at
2821. The credit would effectively leave the intrastate manufacturer/wholesaler in the same position it enjoyed under Washington's existing tax: it would receive a credit against its manufacturing tax liability for the wholesale taxes it paid, which has the same effect as an exemption from
manufacturing tax liability because the manufacturing and wholesaling taxes were imposed at the
same rates. At the same time, the credit would guarantee that the Washington manufacturer
selling in other states paid only a single tax - a wholesale tax to the state of sale, if the state of
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The Court's reaffirmance of its commitment to the "internal consistency" principle drew an impassioned dissent - this time from Justice Scalia, 34 who was not on the Court when Container and Armco
were decided. Justice Scalia took the Court to task for its application
of an "internal consistency" principle that was "nowhere to be found
in the Constitution."35 He chided the Court for overruling "a rather
lengthy list of prior decisions" 36 in applying the "internal consistency"
test to the case before it. And, while characterizing as "dictum"37
Armco's extension of the "internal consistency" principle to questions
other than fair apportionment, Justice Scalia declared that if one nevertheless "insists on viewing it as holding, and thus as conflicting with
decades of precedents upholding internally inconsistent state taxes ...
Armco rather than those numerous other precedents ought to be
overruled. " 38
Justice Scalia's quarrel with the Court over its application of the
"internal consistency" principle, however, was based more on considerations of constitutional policy than on any abstract commitment to
stare decisis. Scalia was willing to accept application of the principle
in the apportionment context where "an inconsistent ... scheme could
sale imposed such a tax, or a manufacturing tax to Washington if it did not. The credit would
likewise guarantee that the out-of-state manufacturer selling in Washington would pay only a
single tax - a manufacturing tax to the state of manufacture, if the state of manufacture imposed
such a tax, and a wholesale tax to Washington if it did not. The second alternative suggested by
the Court was simply to repeal the manufacturing tax. 107 S. Ct. at 2821.
In apparent response to the Court's first suggestion, the Washington legislature enacted legislation providing credits against Washington B & 0 tax liability for gross receipts taxes paid to
other states. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.04.440 (Supp. 1988). Under the legislation,
Washington manufacturers making out-of-state sales and out-of-state manufacturers maldng
sales in Washington receive a credit against B & 0 tax liability for gross receipts taxes they pay to
other states. This so-called "credit fix" was estimated to cost the state $42 million. 1988 Daily
Tax Report (BNA) No. 24 at H-9 (Feb. 5, 1988). The Washington Supreme Court limited the
fiscal damage from the Court's opinion by holding that it should only apply prospectively and
that refunds therefore were not required. National Can Corp. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue,
199 Wash. 2d 878, 749 P.2d 1286, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2030 (1988).
It is worth noting that the second alternative suggested by the Court - repealing the manufacturing tax - would not protect the interstate business from the very burdens the Court identified in Tyler Pipe, even though it would solve the "internal consistency" problem. If half the
states adopted taxes on manufacturing (without taxes on wholesaling) and halfthe states adopted
taxes on wholesaling (without taxes on manufacturing) the interstate manufact.urer/wholesaler
would still suffer the competitive disadvantage of paying two taxes while its intrastate counterpart paid only one. For further discussion of and a suggested solution to this problem, see text
accompanying notes 216-20 infra.
34. Justice Scalia was joined in this part of his dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See 107 S.
Ct. at 2823.
.
35.
36.
37.
38.

107 S.
107 S.
107 S.
107 S.

Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.

at
at
at
at

2824 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2824.
2824.
2824.
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result in taxation of more than 100 percent of [a] firm's net income." 39
But where a "tax is assessed not on unitary income but on discrete
events such as sale, manufacture, and delivery, which can occur in a
single State or in different States, that apportionment principle is not
applicable; there is simply no unitary figure or event to apportion."4-0
Rather than expand Armco's holding to "revolutionize the law of state
taxation,"41 Scalia would have adhered to "our long tradition of judging State taxes on their own terms"42 and would not "strik[e] them
down on the-basis of assumptions as to what other States might do." 43
D. American Trucking Associations v. Scheiner
On the same day it rendered its decision in Tyler Pipe, the Court
elaborated further on the "internal consistency" doctrine in American
Trucking Associations v. Scheiner, 44 which invalidated Pennsylvania's
lump-sum annual taxes on the operation of trucks in the state. The
taxes at issue were an axle tax ranging from $72 to $180 per truck and
a $25 identification marker fee. The truckers attacked these levies
under the commerce clause on the ground, among others, that they
imposed a multiple tax burden on interstate commerce.45 If Pennsylvania had the right to impose a fiat tax on their operations, the
truckers claimed, then so could every other state, and the cumulative
consequences of such a regime would impose a crippling financial burden on interstate motor carriers.46 In addressing this contention, the
Court returned again to the principle of "internal consistency" - "the
test ... that we have applied in other contexts."47
Before putting the challenged exactions to the test, the Court ap107 S. Ct. at 2824.
107 S. Ct. at 2824-25.
107 S. Ct. at 2825.
107 S. Ct. at 2826.
107 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis in original).
44. 107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987). In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that I served
as counsel to the American Trucking Associations in the Scheiner case. The views expressed
here, however, are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the American Trucking
Associations.
45. The truckers' other principal argument was that the taxes discriminated against interstate commerce by imposing a substantially higher effective tax rate on trucks registered outside
the state than on trucks registered in the state. Because flat taxes are not levied in proportion to
the extent of a vehicle's use of a state's roads, they result in lower per mile costs for heavy users
than for light users of the state's highways. Because the average Pennsylvania-registered truck
used the state's roads more extensively than the average out-of-state truck, the lower effective tax
rate inured to the benefit of the local trucker by comparison to his out-of-state counterpart.
46. Brieffor American Trucking Associations at 35, American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner,
107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987) (No. 86-357).
47. 107 S. Ct. at 2840.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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plied the test to the registration fees and fuel consumption taxes that
all states impose on the trucking industry. Although registration fees
can be characterized as fl.at taxes imposed by every state, they nevertheless pass the "internal consistency" test because, as a result of reciprocity and apportionment provisions,48 they do not impose
cumulative tax burdens upon the interstate carrier not borne by its
intrastate competitor.
Under this test, even though the registration fee is assessed, as indeed it
has been, by ev~ry jurisdiction, it causes no impermissible interference
with free trade because every State respects the registration of every
other State. Payment of one registration fee enables a carrier to operate
a vehicle either locally or in the interstate market. Having paid one registration fee, a vehicle may pass among the States as freely as it may
roam the State in which it is based; the Commerce Clause is not offended
when state boundaries are economically irrelevant.49

Motor fuel taxes imposed by Pennsylvania likewise passed the "internal consistency" test even though they were imposed by every jurisdiction. Because they are apportioned to mileage in Pennsylvania,
they impose no greater burden on the interstate than on the intrastate
carrier. Each pays the same amount "for traveling a certain distance
that happens to be within Pennsylvania." 5 0
But Pennsylvania's fl.at taxes for the use of its roads failed the "internal consistency" test. Payment of the fl.at taxes to Pennsylvania,
unlike payment of registration fees, provided no immunity from payment of similar taxes imposed by other states. Nor were fl.at taxes,
unlike motor fuel taxes, apportioned to some neutral factor like extent
of road use, which made state lines irrelevant. While registration fees
and motor fuel taxes could thus be replicated by every state without
putting the interstate carrier at a competitive disadvantage, the same
could not be said of unapportioned fl.at taxes. "If each State imposed
flat taxes for the privilege of making commercial entrances into its
territory, there is no conceivable doubt that commerce among the
States would be deterred." 51
48. Reciprocity agreements among the states grant owners of vehicles paying registration fees
to one state the privilege of operating over the highways of other states. In addition, many states
participate in the International Registration Plan under which registration fees paid for a truck
are apportioned among member states in accordance with the number of miles driven by the
truck in each state. See Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2834.
49. 107 S. Ct. at 2840.
50. 107 S. Ct. at 2840.
51. 107 S. Ct. at 2840. The Court in Scheiner reaffirmed its view expressed in Armco and
Tyler Pipe that the application of the "internal consistency" test does not depend on whether
states other than the taxing state have in fact imposed similar taxes so as to place an actual
burden on interstate commerce. 107 S. Ct. at 2841. Yet it went on to note that other states had
in fact adopted flat taxes so that the threat to free trade was in no sense hypothetical. Moreover,
some states had adopted retaliatory taxes assessed on motor vehicles based in Pennsylvania or
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Dissenting from the Court's opinion in Scheiner, Justice Scalia reiterated his view expressed in Tyler Pipe that the "internal consistency"
test was neither grounded in the Constitution nor compelled by the
Court's precedents. 52 This time Justice Scalia's sentiments were
shared not only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined his dissenting
opinion in Tyler Pipe, 53 but also, in a separate dissenting opinion, by
Justices O'Connor and Powell. 54 In her dissenting opinion, Justice
O'Connor refused to "read Armco as establishing a grandiose version
of the 'internal consistency test' as the constitutional measure of all
state taxes under the Commerce Clause." 55 She read Armco as establishing at most "that a tax that is facially discriminatory is unconstitutional if it is not 'internally consistent,' " 56 and would in no event
extend the "internal consistency" principle to nondiscriminatory
taxes. "Creating an 'internal consistency' rule of general application,"
concluded Justice O'Connor, was "an entirely novel enterprise that the
Court undertakes for the first time in this case." The Court, in her
judgment, offered "no reason why such a rule is necessary or
desirable. " 57

II.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE "INTERNAL
CONSISTENCY" DOCTRINE

The Court's apparent embrace of the "internal consistency" doctrine has consequences far beyond its immediate impact on the taxes at
issue in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner. In the course of its opinions
in these cases, the Court disapproved a number of precedents sustaining taxes that fail the "internal consistency" test. Moreover, the
Court's adoption of "internal consistency" as a general principle of
commerce clause adjudication places many other state tax levies under
a constitutional cloud.
A.
1.

The Precedents Disapproved by the Court

General Motors Corporation v. Washington

Twenty-three years before it struck down Washington's B & 0 tax
other flat tax states, and these levies threatened to "divide and disrupt the market for interstate
transportation services." 107 S. Ct. at 2841.
S2. 107 S. Ct. at 28Sl (Scalia, J., dissenting).
S3. See text at note 34 supra.
S4. 107 S. Ct. at 2848-Sl (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist also joined this
opinion.
SS. 107 S. Ct. at 28SO.
S6. 107 S. Ct. at 28SO.
S1. 107 S. Ct. at 28SO.
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in Tyler Pipe, the Supreme Court sustained the application of the tax
to an out-of-state manufacturer making wholesale sales in the state. In
General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 58 the Court held that neither the
commerce clause nor the due process clause was ·offended by the
state's levy of a tax on General Motors' gross receipts from sales to
Washington dealers. The Court's opinion made no reference to the
doctrine of "internal consistency," which would remain in gestation
for another two decades. Interestingly enough, however, Justice
Goldberg's dissent in General Motors articulated such a doctrine in
substance.
Justice Goldberg observed that Washington's B & 0 tax had at one
time exempted Washington manufacturer/wholesalers from the state's
wholesaling tax under its "multiple activities" exemption. Anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Armco, the Washington Supreme
Court struck down the tax in 1948 on the ground that it discriminated
against interstate commerce by taxing wholesale sales by out-of-state
manufacturers to Washington purchasers, while exempting wholesale
sales by Washington manufacturers to Washington purchasers. 59
Washington thereupon amended its "multiple activities" exemption to
provide that local manufacturer/wholesalers would be subject to the
wholesaling tax but exempt from the manufacturing tax. In Justice
Goldberg's judgment, this cosmetic change in tlJ.e Washington scheme
"would seem to have essentially the same economic effect on interstate
sales but has the advantage of appearing nondiscriminatory." 60 As
Justice Goldberg explained,
,
[e]ven under the amended "multiple activities" exemption, ... an out-ofstate firm manufacturing goods in a State having the same taxation provisions as does Washington would be subjected to
taxes on interstate
sales to Washington customers. The firm would pay the producing State
a local manufacturing tax measured by sales receipts and would also pay
Washington a tax on wholesale sales to Washington residents. Under
such taxation programs, if an out-of-state manufacturer competes with a
Washington manufacturer, the out-of-state manufacturer may be seriously disadvantaged by the duplicative taxation. 61
The Court's response to Justice Golberg's con:µnerce clause objection was that the taxpayer had failed to "demonstrat[e] what definite
burden, in a constitutional sense" 62 any other states' taxes had imposed on the activities taxed by Washington. "In such cases," the

two

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

377 U.S. 436 (1964).
Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d 658, 664, 192 P.2d 976, 979 (1948).
General Motors, 377 U.S. at 460 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
377 U.S. at 460.
377 U.S. at 449.
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Court declared, "we have refrained from passing on the question of
'multiple taxation.' " 63 In other words, because the taxpayer had not
shown that Washington's tax, considered in conjunction with other
states' taxes, had in fact subjected the interstate manufacturer/wholesaler to a tax burden on its manufacturing-wholesaling activities
greater than that imposed on its intrastate counterpart's manufacturing-wholesaling activities, the taxpayer had no constitutionally cognizable claim.
Justice Goldberg's dissent in General Motors was rehabilitated in
Tyler Pipe. The Court in Armco had relied on the dissent for its condemnation of Washington's earlier taxing scheme, which, as noted
above, 64 was identical to West Virginia's. 65 In Tyler Pipe, the Court
came full circle and adopted Justice Goldberg's views in their entirety.
It declared that its reliance on Justice Golberg's opinion in Armco
compelled it to "agree with Justice Goldberg's conclusion that the exemption before us is the practical equivalent of the exemption that the
Washington Supreme Court invalidated in 1948.''66 To the extent that
General Motors was inconsistent· with this conclusion, it was
overruled. 67
2.

The ''Flat Tax" Precedents

In Scheiner, as in Armco and Tyler Pipe, there was little doubt that
a straightforward application of the "internal consistency" principle to
the taxes at issue would brand them as unconstitutional. Indeed, Justice Scalia's dissent in Tyler Pipe, while castigating the Court for its
adoption of the "internal consistency" test, nevertheless conceded that
"[i]t is clear . . . that . . . any unapportioned flat tax on multistate
activities, such as the axle tax or marker fee at issue in Scheiner" 68
would fail the test. The real problem the Court confronted in
Scheiner, therefore, was not whether flat taxes for highway use could
survive commerce clause scrutiny under the "internal consistency"
criterion. Rather, it was how to deal with the fact that the Court had
previously considered and squarely rejected commerce clause attacks
on such taxes.
In a series of cases decided between 1935 and 1950, the Court upheld fiat taxes for highway use in the face of the contention that such
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

377 U.S. at 449.

See text at note 59 supra.
Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984).
Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2817 (1987).
107 S. Ct. at 2820.
107 S. Ct. at 2824 (Scalia J., dissenting).
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taxes violated the commerce clause because they were not proportional to the vehicle's use of the roads in the state. 69 In sustaining
these taxes, the Court reasoned that taxes precisely calibrated to wear
and tear of the highways by a particular vehicle-would not be administratively feasible; that the taxes at issue were imposed for the privilege
of using the highways rather than their actual use, and out-of-state
vehicle owners could not complain if they failed to avail themselves of
the opportunity to use the roads as much as in-state vehicle owners;
and that the taxes at issue were not burdensome to interstate carriers. 70 If these precedents were good law, then the "internal consistency" principle - at least in its broad configuration - was not.
Forced to choose between its old and its new doctrine, the Court
chose the latter. The Court observed that the holdings of many of the
earlier flat highway tax cases turned on the fact that the taxes were
exacted in consideration for the "privilege" of using the state's highways, a taxable "local" subject, rather than the privilege of doing interstate business.71 In recent years, however, the Court has taken
considerable pains to discredit the privilege doctrine and to eliminate
it from commerce clause analysis. 72 Thus, the Court concluded that
the precedents upholding fiat taxes can no longer support the broad
proposition . . . that every fiat tax for the privilege of using a State's
highways must be upheld even if it has a clearly discriminatory effect on
commerce by reason of that commerce's interstate character. 73
Despite the Court's disapproval of its fiat tax precedents, the Court
did not completely jettison them. The Court recognized, as it had in
its earlier decisions, that the commerce clause did not prevent the
states from employing fiat taxes when they are the only practicable
means of collecting revenue from highway users and when the use of
69. See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commn., 295 U.S. 285 (1935)
(Aero Mayflower I); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Commrs., 332 U.S. 495 (1947)
(Aero Mayflower II); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
70. See Aero Mayflower I. 295 U.S. at 289; Aero Mayflower II. 332 U.S. at 503-04, 506 n.19;
Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. at 544, 546-47. Perhaps because the Court viewed the highway tax cases as sui generis, it never felt compelled in these cases to reconcile the results with its
long line of precedents invalidating fiat fee drummers' license ta.lees as burdens on interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell,
311 U.S. 454 (1940); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
71. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2845-46.
72. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 614-17 (1981) (overruling
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922)); Department of Revenue v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 743-50 (1978) (overruling Joseph v. Carter &
Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) and Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax
Commn., 302 U.S. 90 (1937)); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278-79
(1977) (overruling Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)).
73. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2847. In so holding, the Court finally reconciled its doctrine
regarding fiat taxes on trucks with its doctrine regarding fiat taxes on drummers. 107 S. Ct. at
2840 n.16; see note 70 supra.
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more refined methods of taxation would impose genuine administrative burdens. 74 Hence, the Court implicitly recognized that there are
some limits to the "internal consistency" principle, even if Pennsylvania was in no position to invoke them. 75
3. Precedents Implicitly Disapproved by the Court

While General Motors and the fiat highway tax cases were the only
precedents that the Court explicitly disparaged in its "internal consistency'' opinions, other precedents may now be of questionable force in
light of Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner. Insofar as it sustained the
application of Washington's B & 0 tax to an out-of-state manufacturer
making wholesale sales in the state, Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue 16 would no longer be followed. 77 Nor, presumably, would the Court's numerous decisions sustaining fiat license taxes
on interstate enterprises.78 If every state imposed a fiat license tax on
the activity in question, the resulting multiple tax burden imposed on
the multistate enterprise engaged in such activity would place it at an
obvious disadvantage to its intrastate competitor in violation of the
"internal consistency" doctrine.
Hinson v. Lott, 1 9 as suggested by Justice Scalia, so is another venerable precedent that has been und~rmined by the "internal consistency"
principle. In Hinson, the Couit considered an Alabama tax of fifty
cents per gallon upon spirituous liquor dealers "introducing any such
74. 107 S. Ct. at 2847.
75. Pennsylvania routinely used mileage figures to determine motor carriers' fuel taxes and
their registration fees (when such fees are figured on an apportioned basis). It likewise apportioned its corporate net income tax, imposed on interstate carriers on a mileage basis. Hence,
under the facts of the case, the exception to the commerce clause bar against flat taxes for those
justified by administrative necessity could not save Pennsylvania's levies, given the availability of
administrative machinery "capable of taking into account at least the gross variations in cost per
unit of highway usage between Pennsylvania-based and out-of-state carriers." 107 S. Ct. at 2847.
76. 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
77. In Tyler Pipe, the Court referred to Standard Pressed Steel as a case that stood for the
proposition, which was subsequently repudiated, that a taxpayer must "prove that specific interstate transactions were subjected to multiple taxation in order to advance a claim of discrimination." Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2817 (1987). See
generally Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term:
Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149 (1976) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Interstate Business].
78. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953) (sustaining over commerce
clause objections flat license taxes on "carters" as applied to "carters" engaged in interstate commerce); Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919) (sustaining over commerce clause
objections $150 license tax as applied to an interstate vendor of soft drinks); Browning v. City of
Waycross, 233 U.S. 16 (1914) (sustaining over commerce clause objections $25 occupation tax as
applied to local agent of interstate vendor of lightning rods).
79. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1869).
80. Tyler Pipe, 101 S. Ct. at 2824 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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liquors into the State for sale .... " 81 The Court acknowledged that
"[i]f this section stood alone in the legislation of Alabama on the subject of taxing liquors," 82 it would discriminate against products of
other states in violation of the commerce. clause. 83 The Court observed, however, that other sections of the statute imposed a tax of
fifty cents per gallon upon whiskey and brands from fruits manufactured in the state. Viewed in light of this "complementary" tax, 84 the
tax on out-of-state liquor was sustained because it was, in the Court's
judgment, part of a scheme that imposed an equal tax on all liquor
sold in the state. 85
Under the "internal consistency" doctrine, however, the taxing
scheme in Hinson would not pass muster. The tax on out-of-state liquor in that case was imposed upon the seller, while the tax on local
liquor was imposed upon the manufacturer. If such taxing provisions
were in force in every state, the manufacturer selling- liquor across
state lines would pay a tax to the state where the liquor was distilled
and to the state where it was sold, whereas the wholly local enterprise,
selling all its liquor in the state where it was distilled, would pay only
the taA on manufacture.

B.

The Impact of the ''Internal Consistency" Doctrine on Existing
State Tax Structures
1.

Unapportioned Flat Taxes

Far more important than the "internal consistency" doctrine's impact on individual Supreme Court precedents is its impact on existing
state tax structures. Needless to say, fiat highway taxes are now vulnerable to constitutional attack, a point that has not been lost on the
trucking industry. 86 More significantly, the imposition of any unap81. Hinson, 15 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 148 (quoting Act of Feb. 22, 1866, 1866 Ala. Acts) (emphasis omitted).
82. 75 U.S. at 150.
83. 75 U.S. at 152.
84. 75 U.S. at 153.
85. 75 U.S. at 153. See generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes, supra note 24.
86. The attack is being vigorously waged by the trucking industry. See American Trucking
Assn. v. Gray, 108 S. Ct. 2 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1987) (granting injunction requiring Arkansas officials to establish escrow fund for tax payments pending challenge to state's flat highway tax); American Trucking Assns. v. Arkansas Highway and Transp. Dept., No. 85-101 (Mar.
14, 1988) Ark. St. Tax Rep. ff200-16 (declaring flat highway tax unconstitutional); Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet v. American Trucking Assns., 746 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1988) (declaring flat
highway tax unconstitutional); Black Beauty Trucking, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue,
No.49T05-8706-TA-00026 (Ind. Tax Ct. Jan. 7, 1988), reported in [Ind.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) ff
200-715; George Transfer, Inc. v. Indiana State Dept. of Revenue, No. 49T05-8706-TA-00027
(Ind. Tax Ct. Jan. 7, 1988), reported in [Ind.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) ff 200-715 (declaring flat
highway tax unconstitutional); American Trucking Assns. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue,
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portioned flat state or local tax on a multistate business would appear
to be vulnerable to attack under the "internal consistency" doctrine,
unless administrative considerations make "more finely calibrated" levies "impracticable."87 This conclusion follows inexorably from a
simple application of the "internal consistency" principle. If every
state were to impose an unapportioned flat tax on business activities in
which both intrastate and interstate enterprises engage, the interstate
business would pay the tax in each state in which it did business,
whereas its intrastate competitor would pay but a single tax in the
state in which it did business. Because the tax is not apportioned to
the activity carried on in the state, the interstate enterprise would bear
a heavier tax burden than its intrastate competitor merely because it
was engaged in interstate commerce - a paradigmatic "impermissible
interference with free trade." 88
The implications of this conclusion are rather unsettling. Every
state imposes initial fees and taxes on domestic and foreign corporations when first organizing or qualifying to do business in the state. 89
Many of these levies are unapportioned flat taxes. 90 Under the "internal consistency" doctrine, such levies may not survive commerce
clause scrutiny. If every state were to impose an unapportioned flat
tax for the privilege of engaging in business activity in the state, 91 the
interstate enterprise would bear ah additional tax burden simply because it was carrying on business across state lines and without regard
512 N.E.2d 920 (Ind. Tax Court 1987) (ordering escrow for tax payments pending challenge to
flat highway tax); National Private Trucking Assn. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 512
N.E.2d 928 (Ind. Tax Court 1987) (ordering escrow for tax payments pending challenge to flat
highway tax). American Trucking Assns. v. Conway, No. S-147-86W (Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 11,
1988), reported in Vt. St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11 200-306 (declaring flat tax on trucks unconstitutional and ordering refund of escrowed taxes).
87. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2847 (1987). Justice Scalia explicitly recognized this point. See text at note 68 supra.
88. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) quoted in text at note 26 supra; see
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1186 (1986).
89. See 1 [All States] State Tax Guide (CCH) 11111-201 to 1-955 (Feb. 1988); All States Tax
Guide (P-H) 11 211-A. The levies discussed in this and the next paragraph are presumed to be
imposed for revenue purposes under the state's taxing power, as distinguished from fees that are
imposed for regulatory purposes under the state's police powers. See 2 [All States] State Tax
Guide (CCH) 1130-000, at 3011-12 (Mar. 1988). Regulatory fees are discussed in the succeeding
paragraphs. See text following note 96 infra.
90. See note 86 supra. Wholly apart from any "internal consistency" objection, many of
these levies impose greater tax burdens on foreign than on domestic corporations, an apparent
violation of the commerce, if not the equal protection, clause. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). But that is the subject of another article.
91. There is no longer a per se objection under the commerce clause to imposing a tax on the
privilege of doing business in the state as applied to an enterprise engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (overruling
Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)).
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to whether it was carrying on more or less business in the state than its
intrastate competitor. Conceivably, such levies could be defended on
the ground of administrative necessity - that it would be impracticable to provide for their apportionment based on some neutral measure
of the extent to which the enterprise has exploited the privilege of conducting business in the state. These arguments have a hollow ring,
however, at least in the overwhelming majority of states that tax income, capital stock, or other bases, and provide, under constitutional
compulsion, methods for apportioning the tax measure to the state. 92
Another broad category of exactions that the "internal consistency" doctrine places in constitutional jeopardy encompasses annual
business license taxes imposed by states and localities for carrying on
particular trades or occupations. 93 Many of these are unapportioned
fiat taxes. 94 The hypothetical replication of these taxes by every state
under the "internal consistency" doctrine imposes a cumulative tax
burden upon the multistate enterprise not borne by its intrastate competitor solely because the multistate business has chosen to do business
in more than one state. For example, Alaska's twenty-five dollar annual business license tax, 95 if adopted by each of the other forty-nine
states, would subject the enterprise doing business in fifty states to a
$1250 tax burden, compared to its local competitor's twenty-five dollar tax burden, even if the farmer's nationwide business was identical
to the latter's in every respect except that it was conducted in fifty
states instead of one. Although the assumption of identity between the
interstate and intrastate business may be unrealistic, the implications
92. It may be argued, contrary to the assumption made at the outset of this paragraph, see
note 89 supra, that organization, initiation, or business qualification fees should not be treated as
true revenue measures because they are more accurately viewed as components of the states'
regulatory regimes governing corporations. As noted below, however, see text at notes 97-105
infra, it is questionable whether this distinction would make a constitutional difference under
"internal consistency" analysis, except in those cases in which it could be demonstrated that
apportionment of the fees in question was administratively impracticable or that the fees in fact
constituted user charges. See text at notes 104-11 infra. As a practical matter, however, there
may be something to be said for a de minimis rule that removed modest corporate organization,
initiation, or qualification fees from the "internal consistency" requirement. Unlike license fees,
which are imposed annually and can be levied on a per store, per truck, or per location basis,
these initial fees are imposed only once and on an enterprise-wide basis.
93. See 2 [All States] State Tax Guide (CCH) ~~ 30-201 to 30-955 (Mar. 1988).
94. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE §§ 40-12-1 to -206 (1985 & Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. §§ 205.013.1965 (1987); [Fla.) St. Tax Rep. (CCH) ~ 33-100; N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 105-33 (1985). A number
of these flat business license taxes are graduated according to the gross receipts of the business,
with the fixed fee increasing with the receipts of the business, usually up to a statutory maximum
above a certain level of receipts. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 47:354 to :357 (West Supp.
1988). Although one can argue that such levies are apportioned to the business done in the state,
insofar as the statutory maximum is not exceeded, once the maximum is exceeded a graduated
flat tax is indistinguishable from an ungraduated flat tax for analytical purposes.
95. Al.AsKA STAT. § 43.70.030 (1983).
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of "internal consistency" analysis are inescapable. 96
A third category of unapportioned flat taxes that may be subject to
constitutional attack under the "internal consistency" doctrine comprises the professional and similar licensing fees that are imposed by
every state. Many of these fees are flat and unapportioned, and, for
that reason, could be challenged under the "internal consistency" rationale set forth in the preceding paragraphs. One feature of these
licensing fees, however, arguably insulates them from challenge under
the "internal consistency" doctrine. In contrast to the exactions discussed above, which were presumed to be imposed for general revenue
purposes pursuant to the state's taxing power, 97 the levies considered
here are presumed to be imposed for regulatory purposes pursuant to
the state's police power. However thin that distinction may be in
some cases, it is a distinction the law recognizes, 98 and the question for
present purposes is whether it is a distinction that makes a constitutional difference insofar as commerce clause (and "internal consistency") analysis is concerned:
The issue whether an exaction is a "tax" or a "fee" arises in a
variety of contexts. Courts have had to determine whether charges by
federal agencies are authorized fees for benefits granted99 or are in substance taxes that can be imposed only by Congress' exercise of its taxing power. 100 They have had to determine whether levies are taxes
subject to priority in bankruptcy proceedings or are fees not entitled to
such priority. 101 And they have had to determine whether exactions
are taxes subject to states' constitutional requirements of uniformity
and equality or are fees not subject to such requirements. 102 There is
no doubt in these cases, however, that the levy, if not an exercise of
governmental tax power is nevertheless an exercise of governmental
96. Although the level of Alaska's tax might preclude, as a practical matter, any legal chal·
lenge to the levy. Compare CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE § 23151 (West Supp. 1988), which imposes
a minimum $300 annual corporate franchise tax that will increase to $800 by 1990. Wholly apart
from "internal consistency" analysis, one might argue that levies such as Alaska's and Califor·
nia's are inconsistent with the analysis in the cases invalidating flat taxes on drummers. See notes
70 & 73 supra.
97. See note 89 supra.
98. See notes 99-102 infra and accompanying text.
99. See 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982) (delegating to administrative agencies the authority to assess
charges in situations where "a service or thing of value" is provided by the agency).
100. See Federal Power Commn. v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974); National
Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
101. See In re Jenny Lynn Mining Co., 780 F.2d 585, 588-89 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Lorber
Indus., 675 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982).
102. See City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac, 308 S.E.2d 527 (W. Va. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984) ("fire service fee" constitutes ad valorem property tax); Newman v.
City of Indianola, 232 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1975) (special assessment for local improvement does
not constitute tax).
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regulatory power. Because the commerce clause applies to state regulation as well as to state taxation, the only question raised by the taxversus-fee issue in the present context is whether the "internal consistency" doctrine is limited in application to levies that are determined
to be taxes.
Although the Court's formal criteria for evaluating commerce
clause challenges to state regulations are not identical to its criteria for
evaluating commerce clause challenges to state taxation, 103 there is no
reason to believe that a regulatory license fee would be immune from
the "internal consistency" requirement merely because it constituted
an exercise of the state's regulatory power rather than an exercise of
the state's taxing power. Surely the evils that the "internal consistency" test was designed to combat are the same regardless of whether
the unapportioned flat levy is an exercise of the tax power or the regulatory power. In each case, the licensee carrying on his trade in more
than one jurisdiction bears a greater financial burden than his intrastate competitor merely because he is engaging in interstate commerce
with the consequent interference with free trade among the states.
Hence there does not appear to be any sound policy basis for distinguishing the "fee" from the "tax" cases insofar as the application of
the "internal consistency" doctrine is concerned.
Despite the general vulnerability of unapportioned flat taxes to
commerce clause challenge under the "internal consistency" principle,
not every unapportioned flat tax would fail to pass muster. As noted
above, 104 when administrative considerations preclude the imposition
of more refined levies, unapportioned flat taxes may be constitutionally
tolerable. Moreover, if an unapportioned flat tax in fact constitutes a
user fee imposed by the taxing authority as a charge for the use of
public services or facilities, and if the fee is neither discriminatory nor
excessive, it will not offend the "internal consistency" doctrine. 105
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, 106 for example, the Court sustained the authority of two municipal airports to impose flat service fees of one dollar for each passenger
boarding a commercial aircraft operating from the airports. As the
Court explained, the levies satisfied the requirements of nondiscrimination and reasonableness:
First, neither fee discriminates against interstate commerce and travel.
103. See Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 SUP. Cr. REV. 51, 65 n.80.
104. See text at notes 74-75 supra.
105. See American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2843-44 (1987).
106. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
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While the vast majority of passengers who board flights at the airports
involved are traveling interstate, both interstate and intt:astate flights are
subject to the same charges. Furthermore, there is no showing of any
inherent difference between these two classes of flights, such that the
application of the same fee to both would amount to discrimination
against one or the other.
Second, these charges reflect a fair, if imperfect approximation of the
use of facilities for whose benefit they are imposed.101

Even if every state (or locality) imposed such a fee, there would be no
impermissible interference with interstate commerce in violation of the
"internal consistency" doctrine: ·both interstate and intrastate passengers would pay according to their use of the facilities, and, although
the facilities were used primarily by interstate passengers, the charge
itself would reasonably approximate the value of the use - so interstate passengers would not be subsidizing governmental services that
would be of primary benefit to local interests.
Few of the unapportioned flat taxes described above could satisfy
the criteria set forth in the Evansville-Vanderburgh case. In the first
place, they cannot fairly be characterized as user charges in the sense
of specific charges imposed by the taxing authority for the use of publicly owned or publicly provided facilities or services. 108 Moreover,
even if so characterized, it would be difficult to demonstrate that the
unapportioned flat taxes considered above - such as corporate qualification levies or annual business license taxes - constitute a "fair ...
approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are imposed"109 when they are not identified with the use of any particular
facilities and are typically paid into the state's general fund. Furthermore, the taxes would in many instances be discriminatory in the sense
that whatever "benefit" is purchased by the levy, the intrastate taxpayer would enjoy more of it than the interstate taxpayer because of its
relatively greater in-state activity. 110 Thus in Scheiner, the Court
pointed out that the flat taxes at issue satisfied neither of the two specific conditions of nondiscrimination and reasonableness imposed by
Evansville-Vanderburgh: "They discriminate against out-of-state vehicles by subjecting them to a much higher charge per mile traveled in
107. 405 U.S. at 717 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original), quoted in Scheiner, 107 S. Ct.
at 2843-44.
108. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981).
109. Evansville-Vanderburgh, 405 U.S. at 717.
110. This is, of course, a factual question. If it could be shown that the out-of-state business
engages in no less commercial activity in the state than its intrastate competitor, the levy would
not be discriminatory. One should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the Court developed
the requirement that taxes must be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in the state in
part because such equivalence between interstate and local commerce cannot be assumed.
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the State, and they do not even purport to approximate fairly the cost
or value of the use of Pennsylvania's roads." 111
2.

Other Unapportioned Taxes

Unapportioned flat taxes are not the only levies threatened by the
"internal consistency" doctrine. Any unapportioned tax imposed on
events or activities that can occur in more than one state would likewise be subject to attack under the "internal consistency" principle.
For example, compensating use taxes 112 imposed by states that do not
grant a credit for sales or use taxes paid to other states, 113 cannot withstand scrutiny under the internal consistency doctrine. Use taxes are
typically levied on "the storage, use or other consumption" of tangible
personal property in the state and are measured by the sales price of
the property. 114 If replicated by every state, these levies would put the
enterprise doing business across state lines at a competitive disadvantage to its wholly intrastate competitor.
If one views use taxes in conjunction with the sales taxes for which
they compensate, the sales-use tax scheme would subject the purchase
111. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2844.
112. Compensating use taxes, which are functionally equivalent and complementarY to sales
taxes, see Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes, supra note 24, at 406-09, were developed to meet
two problems created by the states' enactment of Sales taxes. Because constitutional strictures
prohibited the states from taxing sales consummated outside their borders or in interstate commerce, states feared that local merchants would lose business when prospective purchasers made
out-of-state purchases to avoid sales tax liability. In addition, the states feared they would lose
revenue as a result of the diversion of sales to nontaxing states. Compensating use taxes addressed these concerns by imposing a levy on the "use" in the state of tangible personal property
that has not already been subjected to a sales tax in the state. The use tax is equal in amount to
the sales 'tax that w_ould have been imposed on the sale of the property in question if the sale had
occurred within the state's taxing jurisdiction. The state overcomes the constitutional hurdle of
taxing an out-of-state or interstate sale by imposing a tax on a subject within its taxing power the local "use" of property. In principle, then, the in-state consumer stands to gain nothing by
making an out-of-state purchase free of sales tax because he will ultimately be saddled with an
identical use tax when the property is brought into the taxing state. Use taxes discriminate on
their face against interstate commerce because they apply only to goods purchased outside the
state. Any in-state purchase would already have been subjected to sales tax and thus have been
exempted from use tax. The Court nevertheless sustained the constitutionality of the use tax
because it viewed the use tax, in conjunction with the sales tax, as imposing an equal burden on
out-of-state and local purchases. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). See
generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes, supra note 24.
113. Nevada grants no such credit. See McCray, Commerce Clause Sanctions Against Taxation on Mail Order Sales: A Re-Evaluation, 17 URB. LAW. 529, 532 n.5 (1985). ,Wyoming law
provides for no such credit, although as a matter of administrative practice the Department of
Revenue and Taxation recognizes a credit for sales taxes, but not for use taxes, paid to other
states. [Wyo.] St. & Loe. Tax Serv. [P-H] 11 21,362. Prior to 1988, South Carolina granted no
such credit. While now permitting a credit for sales taxes paid to other states, South Carolina
continues to deny credit for use taxes paid to another state. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-6 (S.C. Tax
Commn. Feb. 10, 1988) S.C. St. Tax Rep. 11200-227. See S.C. CODE REGS. 117-174,66 (1976);
s.c. CooE ANN. § 12-35-815 (Supp. 1987).
114. See, e.g.• NEV. REV. STAT. § 372.185 (1987).
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of goods in one state for use in another to two exactions - a sales tax
in the state of purchase and a use tax in the state of use. The purchase
of goods for local use, however, would be subjected to only a sales
tax.115
If one views use taxes in isolation from sales taxes, use taxes would
still subject the interstate business to the risk of multiple taxation not
borne by its intrastate competitor. The interstate business using property in two or more states would pay a tax in each state in which the
property was used whereas the intrastate business using the property
in an identical fashion, except that it was not transported across state
lines, would pay but a single tax. Under either view of the use tax, the
"impermissible interference with free trade" 116 is self-evident.
The overwhelming majority of states avoid any "internal consistency" objection to their use taxes by providing a credit for sales or use
taxes paid to other states. 117 They thus assure that the sale or ·use of
property is in principle taxed just once whether or not it crosses state
lines. 118 The Supreme Court, at least up to now, has expressly refrained from holding that the states are constitutionally required to
115. One might argue that use truces violate the commerce clause wholly apart from any
"internal consistency" objection because they apply only to goods that are purchased outside the
state and used within it. See note 112 supra. As noted above, however, the Court held that the
apparent discrimination disappears when use truces are considered in conjunction with sales taxes
that place an equivalent burden on goods purchased locally. If states imposed two wholly independent levies on the sale and use of goods within the state, no commerce clause claim, based
on "internal consistency" or other objections, could be raised to the resulting true consequences.
Purchasers of goods in one state for use in another would pay a sales true to the state of purchase
and a use true to the state of use; purchasers of goods for local use would pay both a sales tax and
a use true to the same state.
116. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984).
117. See All States Tax Guide (P-H) ~ 256; McCray, supra note 113, at 532.
118. In practice, trucation of the use of property by more than one state can occur if states
have inconsistent schemes for granting credits for use truces paid to other states. See generally
McCray, supra note 113, at 531-36. Most states impose use truces only ifthe taxpayer first uses
the property within their jurisdiction and grant a credit for use taxes paid to another state only if
that other state was the state of first use. Id. at 533 n.7. Some states, however, impose a use tax
on the use of property within their jurisdiction, even though the property was first used in another state, so long as the trucpayer has not previously paid a use tax with respect to that property
to some other state. Id. at 533 n.8. Hence when the property is subjected to use tax in a state
that follows the rule of "first collection," and that state is not the state of first use, the taxpayer
will be subject to double taxation if a state in which the property was first used follows the rule of
"first use" and asserts liability on that basis without allowing a credit for the tax paid to the state
of subsequent use.
This is not an "internal consistency" problem, however. Both of the crediting schemes described above are "internally consistent" in the sense that, if adopted by every jurisdiction, use
true would be due to only one state - either the state of first use or the state of first collection.
The problem of multiple taxation resulting from different, but internally consistent, crediting
schemes is therefore analogous to the problem of multiple taxation resulting from varying, but
internally consistent apportionment formulas, see text at notes 9-19 supra, and would probably
not give rise to a commerce clause objection. Cf Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267
(1978).
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grant such a credit. 119 The Court's embrace of the "internal consistency" doctrine, however, may be fairly regarded as resolving the
issue. 120
Like use truces that provide no credit for sales or use taxes paid to
other states, New York's stock transfer true runs into constitutional
difficulties under the "internal consistency" doctrine. The levy is imposed on "all sales, or agreements to sell, or memoranda of sales and
all deliveries or transfers of shares or certificates of stock" 121 in any
foreign or domestic corporation at a fixed rate per share, graduated
according to the price of the share. The true applies if any one of the
five raxable events occurs in New York, regardless of where the rest of
the transaction takes place, and if more than one taxable event occurs
in the state, only one true is payable on the entire transaction. 122 If
every state were to adopt such a taxing scheme, the taxpayer making
an interstate trade 123 would pay two or more taxes whereas a taxpayer
making a wholly local trade would pay but a single rax. 124 The "impermissible interference with free trade" 125 under the "internal consistency'' doctrine is again apparent. 126
119. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1985); Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306
U.S. 167, 172 (1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 587 (1937).
120. Justice Scalia certainly thinks it did. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of
Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2824 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Professors Nowak and
Rotunda have argued that the states are not required to grant a credit for sales or use taxes paid
to other states against their own use taxes, Nowak & Rotunda, Sales and Use Tax Credits, Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, and the Useless Multiple Tax Concept, 20 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 273 (1987), and that Armco "only superficially appears to support a multiple taxation
challenge" to the failure to grant such a credit, id. at 310, their argument loses much of its force
after Tyler Pipe and Scheiner. Even before the emergence of the "internal consistency" doctrine,
moreover, both courts and commentators had concluded that the failure of a state to grant a
credit against its use tax for sales or use taxes paid to other states would violate the commerce
clause. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 272 Cal. App. 2d 728, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 373 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970); McCray, supra note 113, at 564; Developments in the Law: Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 953, 999-1000 (1962).
121. N.Y. TAX LAW§ 270(1) (McKinney 1986).
122. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 440.2 (1976).
123. For example, a sale on the Boston Stock Exchange of shares to be delivered in New
York.
124. Indeed, as many as five states could in principle tax the same transaction if each of the
five events - the sale, the agreement to sell, the memorandum of the sale, the delivery of the
shares, and the transfer of the shares (on the transfer agent's books)- were to occur in a different state. However, federal law prohibits a state from taxing a change in the beneficial or record
ownership of securities merely because the transfer agent's facilities are located in the taxing
state. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d) (1982).
125. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984).
126. In 1977, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of New York's stock transfer tax
that discriminated against interstate commerce by providing lower rates for certain trades made
on the New York Stock Exchange. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318
(1977). These provisions were subsequently repealed. 1977 N.Y. Laws 878. In his dissenting
opinion in Tyler Pipe, Justice Scalia pointed out that the pre-1968 version of New York's stock
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One final example of an existing taxing scheme that appears to violate the "internal consistency" principle is Florida's intangible property tax. The tax is imposed at the rate of one mill ($1 per $1,000) on
all intangible property, except for obligations secured by Florida realty.127 As construed by the Florida courts, the tax applies to intangible property owned by taxpayers domiciled in the state, whether or not
the property has acquired a business situs12s in Florida, 129 as well as to
intangible property owned by taxpayers domiciled outside of Florida
when the property has acquired a business situs in the state. 130 According to the Florida court,
[t]he taxation of aecounts receivable by a state in which a corporation
has acquired a business situs 131 does not preclude the corporation domiciliary state from also levying an intangible tax on accounts receivable,
as a corporation must pay its share of the cost of government to the
sovereign from which it derives its very existence.132
Although the Florida court's statement accurately reflects the
Supreme Court's reading of the due process clause, which does not
prevent two states from imposing a tax upon the same intangible property, 133 it.is questionable whether it can survive the Court's reading of
the commerce clause as expressed in the "internal consistency" principle. If every state adopted an intangible property tax that applied both
to property owned by its domiciliaries and to property with a business
transfer tax, which in pertinent part resembles the existing levy, was characterized by the Court
in Boston Stock Exchange as " 'neutral as to in-state and out-of-state sales.' " Tyler Pipe Indus.
v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2824 n.2 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quot·
ing Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 330). Scalia went on to observe, however, that this was
"plainly not true if internal consistency is a requirement of neutrality: assuming that all States
had New York's pre-1968 scheme, if sale and delivery both took place in New York, there would
be a single tax, while if sale took place in New York and delivery in New Jersey, there would be
double taxation." 107 S. Ct. at 2824 n.2. The problem with New York's stock transfer tax can
also be viewed as a species of the multiple activities exemption considered in Armco and Tyler
Pipe. Taxpayers who engage in more than one taxable activity in New York are exempt from tax
on more than one taxable activity. See text at notes 212-31 infra.
127. FLA. STAT. § 199.032 (1987).
128. Intangibles have historically been taxable at the domicile of their owner under the doc·
trine of mobilia sequuntur personam (movables follow the person). The Supreme Court, however, has "recognize[d] the principle that choses in action may acquire a situs for taxation other
than at the domicile of their owner if they have become integral parts of some local business."
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 213 (1930).
129. Florida Steel Corp. v. Dickinson, 308 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
319 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1975), ajfd., 328 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1976).
130. Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 456 So. 2d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), petition for review dismissed, 458 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1984).
131. It is the intangible property, not the corporation, that may acquire a "business situs"
apart from the domicile of its owner. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
132. Florida Steel Corp., 308 So. 2d at 626. See also National Linen Serv. Corp. v. Thompson, 103 Ga. App. 786, 120 S.E.2d 779 (1961).
133. See State Tax Commn. v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S.
357 (1939).

October 1988]

Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation

163

situs in the state, the enterprise domiciled in one state but employing
intangible property in another, where it acquires a business situs,
would pay two taxes on its intangibles whereas its wholly intrastate
competitor would pay but one tax. Assuming that the Court would
have little difficulty in concluding that such interference with interstate capital flows affected commerce so as to warrant commerce
clause scrutiny, 134 the "impermissible interference with free trade" 135
under the "internal consistency" doctrine would be self-evident. 136
III.

A.

THE DEFENSIBILITY OF THE "INTERNAL
CONSISTENCY" DOCTRINE

''Internal Consistency" and Commerce Clause Policy

Assuming that the "internal consistency" doctrine is good law, the
134. In recent years, the Court has flatly repudiated "any suggestion that a state tax or regulation affecting interstate commerce is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny because it attaches only to a 'local' or intrastate activity." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 615 (1981). In Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 302 Or. 128, 727 P.2d 614 (1986) (en
bane), the court held that the commerce clause was implicated by an Oregon income tax provision limiting nonrecognition of gain upon the conversion or exchange of real property to conversions or exchanges in which the newly acquired property was situated in the state. The court
declared that "[b]ecause capital investment is basic to a system of free trade, and because the
framers intended to create an area of free trade under the Commerce Clause, a state law keeping
investment capital, even for land, within the state can have a restrictive impact on capital markets and implicate the Commerce Clause." 302 Or. at 135, 727 P.2d at619. See also Dominion·
Natl. Bank v. Olsen, 771 F.2d 108, 118 (6th Cir. 1985); Aronson v. Commonwealth, 401 Mass.
244, 248-49, 516 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1987); Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism: The Case ofDiscriminatory State Income Tax Treatment
of Out-of-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REV. 473, 562 (1978).
135. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984).
136. The "internal consistency" doctrine likewise casts doubt upon the constitutionality of a
state's taxing the entire income of domestic corporations doing business in other states while at
the same time taxing an apportioned share of the income of foreign corporations doing business
in the state. For many years, the view had been "widely held that the State of incorporation is
free to impose a tax on the entire net income of a domestic corporation." SPECIAL SUBCOMM.
ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE CoMMERCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 160
(1964); see also G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 3133 (2d ed. 1950). Wholly apart from the "internal consistency" doctrine, it is open to question
whether this view can survive the Court's modern opinions sustaining a state's right to tax an
apportioned share of a nondomiciliary corporation's income or property while rejecting the claim
that the state of the corporation's domicile had the exclusive power to tax all such income or
property. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 445-46 (1980); Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 441-44 (1979) (dictum); see Hellerstein, State
Income Taxation, supra note 19, at 135-37. But see Commercial Credit Consumer Servs., Inc. v.
Norberg, 518 A.2d 1336 (R.I. 1986) (sustaining over commerce clause objections state's imposition of tax on entire net income of domestic corporation carrying on substantial business outside
the state). Assuming the states' power to tax their domestic corporations on their entire net
income survived Mobil and Japan Line, however, the "internal consistency" doctrine would appear to bar a scheme that taxed domestic corporations on their entire income while taxing foreign
corporations on an apportioned share of such income. If replicated by every state, the wholly
intrastate CQrporation would pay tax on no more than 100% of its income whereas the corporation doing business in more than one state would pay tax on more than 100% of its income.
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question remains whether it makes good sense. As a matter of theory,
it is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that the commerce clause
forbids taxes that penalize taxpayers merely because they do business
across state lines. 137 And the "internal consistency" doctrine may be
viewed as a logical corollary to that proposition. As the preceding
discussion has made clear, unapportioned taxes in general, and unapportioned flat taxes in particular, can place a burden on the interstate
business that is not borne by its intrastate competitor - a burden attributable solely to the fact that the interstate business plies its trade in
more than one state. If the "internal consistency" doctrine functions
as a mechanism for invalidating such levies - and it does, the doctrine serves a central purpose of the commerce clause.
The difficulties with the "internal consistency" doctrine lie in its
problematic implications for commerce clause analysis rather than in
the commerce clause policies it plainly serves. Aside from Justice
Scalia's skepticism over the "theoretical underpinning for judicial 'enforcement' of the Commerce Clause," 138 no sitting Supreme Court
Justice would dissent from the view that the commerce clause prohibits taxes that bear more heavily on the interstate than the intrastate
enterprise merely because the former does business across state lines.
Nor would there be any dispute that the "internal consistency" principle implements that view. The problem is that it arguably does more
than that. As the dissenting opinions in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and
Scheiner observed, 139 and as the discussion in Part II of this article
demonstrates, general application of the "internal consistency" doctrine undermines the authority of a number of Supreme Court precedents and places many existing state taxes in constitutional jeopardy.
Perhaps this is as it should be, and the cases and taxes that have been
threatened by the "internal consistency" doctrine do not deserve to
survive in light of the policy that the "internal consistency" rule im137. See Regan, supra note 88, at 1186.
138. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2827 (1987) (Scalia,

J., dissenting). Beyond his disagreement with the Court over its application of the "internal
consistency" principle in Tyler Pipe, see text at notes 34-43 & 52 supra, Justice Scalia launched a
broad-based attack on the Court's negative commerce clause jurisprudence. According to Justice
Scalia, the Court in adjudicating controversies under the negative commerce clause "has engaged
in an enterprise that it has been unable to justify by textual support or even coherent nontextual
theory, that it was almost certainly not intended to undertake, and that it has not undertaken
very well." Tyler Pipe, 101 S. Ct. at 2829 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is worth noting that Justice
Scalia spoke only for himself in expressing these views. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, no friend
of the negative commerce clause, carefully distanced himself from the portion of Justice Scalia's
dissent in Tyler Pipe that questioned the constitutional basis for the Court's negative commerce
clause doctrine, although the Chief Justice joined Scalia in his attack on the Court's application
of the negative commerce clause to the case under consideration. 107 S. Ct. at 2823.
139.' See text at notes 28-29, 34-43 & 52-57 supra.

October 1988]

Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation

165

plements. On the other hand, in the face of assertions that general
application of the "internal consistency" principle is "an entirely novel
enterprise" 140 that would "revolutionize the law of state taxation,"1 41
it is worthwhile inquiring whether the Court could have faithfully effectuated its commerce clause policy by more familiar means.
B.

"Internal Consistency" and Multiple Taxation:
Potential or Actual

One of the principal complaints lodged against the "internal consistency" doctrine is that it measures the validity of state taxes on the
basis of hypothetical rather than actual burdens on interstate commerce. By assuming that other states have adopted the challenged
levy imposed by the taxing state, the "internal consistency" test may
condemn the tax even though no other state has imposed a similar
levy. 142 As a consequence, taxes on interstate business may be struck
down even though the business in fact pays no more tax than its intrastate competitor. 143 This was clearly the case in Armco, where the
Ohio-based manufacturer selling in West Virginia pfrid no manufacturing tax to Ohio; it was also true, for the most part, in Tyler Pipe,
where few of the Washington manufacturers selling in other states or
out-of-state manufacturers selling in Washington could point to gross
receipts taxes on wholesaling or manufacturing they had paid to other
states. 144 Justice Rehnquist could therefore assail the "internal consistency" doctrine as rooted in "legal abstractions," 145 and he could complain that "[w]here a State's taxes are linked exactly to the activities
taxed, it should be unnecessary to examine a hypothetical taxing
scheme to see if interstate commerce would be unduly burdened." 146
Justice Scalia could likewise object that the Court, by relying on the
"internal consistency" principle, was failing to adhere "to our long
140. American Trucking Assns v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2850 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
141. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2825 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. See text at notes 25-26 & note 51 supra.
143. Wholly apart from "internal consistency" concerns, the fact that the interstate business
pays no more tax than its intrastate competitor does not necessarily mean that the interstate
enterprise's claim is "abstract" or "hypothetical." If the interstate and intrastate business pay
the same tax, but the intrastate business receives more governmental benefits for the tax, then it
can be argued that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce in a very concrete way by
imposing a higher effective tax rate on the interstate business. See Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 2841,
2847; note 45 supra.
144. See National Can Corp. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 109 Wash. 2d 878, 889, 749
P.2d 1286, 1292, appeal dismissed and cen. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2030 (1988).
145. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 647 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963)).
146. 467 U.S. at 648.
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tradition of judging State taxes on their own terms" 147 and not "striking them down on the basis of assumptions as to what other States
might do." 148
Insofar as the "internal consistency" doctrine is designed to prevent multiple taxation of interstate business, however, the Court's
"long tradition" is not precisely the one described by Justice Scalia. 149
Indeed, as originally formulated, the multiple taxation doctrine was
couched in the language of possibility rather than certainty. Constitutionality depended on whether multiple burdens were capable of being
imposed, not on whether they actually had been. In his seminal opinion in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue 150 articulating the
multiple taxation doctrine, Justice Stone observed that
[t]he vice characteristic of those [taxes] which have been held invalid is
that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be
capable, in point of substance, of being imposed with equal right by every
state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce
is being done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it
would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce.151

In J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 152 which followed on the
heels of Western Live Stock, the Court declared:
The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that
the tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived
from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such a
character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by
States in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they are
manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk
of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and
which the cominerce clause forbids.1 53

Other opinions rendered during the formative era of the multiple taxation doctrine likewise adhered to the precept that the risk of multiple
taxation sufficed to invalidate the tax and that proof of actual multiple
taxation was unnecessary.154
147. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2826 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
148. 107 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis in original).
149. The following discussion draws freely from Hellerstein, Construing the Uniform Division
of Income for Tax Purposes Act: Reflections on the Illinois Supreme Court's Reading of the
"Throwback" Rule, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 768, 799-803 (1978) and Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 19, at 131-35.
150. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
151. 303 U.S. at 255-56 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
152. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
153. 304 U.S. at 311 (emphasis added).
154. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954); Ott v.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949); Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealy,
334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 429 (1947)
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In subsequent opinions, the Court was not as consistent as it might
have been in addressing the question whether the risk of multiple taxation provided the predicate for striking down a state tax on commerce
clause grounds. On a few occasions, the Court seemed to require taxpayers to demonstrate something more to support their claims. Thus
in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 155 the Court
noted that "[t]here is nothing to show that multiple taxation is present. We cannot deal in abstractions. In this type of case the taxpayers
must show that the formula places a burden upon interstate commerce
in a constitutional sense." 156 And in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 151 the Court reiterated this position and noted that "[i]t has
not been demonstrated what definite burden, in a constitutional sense,
the St. Louis tax places on the identical shipments by which Washington measures its tax" 158 or "that Oregon levies any tax on appellant's
activity bearing on Washington sales." 159 Yet in other decisions rendered during the same period, the Court continued to espouse the view
that the commerce clause forbade taxes that created a mere risk of
multiple taxation.160
The Court's 1978 opinion in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
Bair 161 might have been read as signaling a shift in the Court's approach to the multiple taxation doctrine. In Moorman, the Court sustained the constitutionality of Iowa's single-factor sales formula for
apportioning corporate income. All of the taxpayer's products sold to
Iowa customers were manufactured in Illinois. The taxpayer sought
(overruled on other grounds by Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978)); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439
(1939); cf. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 358 (1944)
(Rutledge, J., concurring) ("either the actuality or the risk of [multiple taxation] makes the total
burden cumulative, discriminatory or special"). Although Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322
U.S. 292 (1944) may be regarded as inconsistent with the "risk" rule, the Court subsequently
read the case narrowly so as to conform to the "risk" rule. Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State
Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1954).
155. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
156. 358 U.S. at 463.
157. 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (overruled by Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987)). See text at notes 58-67 supra (discussing the overruling of General
Motors in Tyler Pipe).
158. 377 U.S. at 449.
159. 377 U.S. at 449.
160. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 563 (1975) ("a
vice in a tax on gross receipts of a corporation doing an interstate business is the risk of multiple
taxation"); Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972) (levy subjected taxpayer to the "risk of a double
tax burden"); Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 614 (1962) ("domiciliary State is
precluded from imposing an ad valorem tax on any property to the extent that it could be taxed
by another State, not merely on such property as is subjected to tax elsewhere") (emphasis in
original).
161. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).

168

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:138

to demonstrate that Iowa's single-factor formula.for apportioning net
income, when considered in conjunction with Illinois' three-factor
formula of property, payroll, and sales, subjected income derived from
its Iowa sales to the risk of duplicative taxation in violation of the
commerce clause.
In rejecting this contention, the Court first declared that the taxpayer had failed to establish "the essential factual predicate for a claim
of duplicative taxation," 162 i.e., it had failed to prove the portion of its.
income derived from Iowa sales that had in fact been taxed by both
Iowa and Illinois. The Court went on to address the taxpayer's multiple taxation claim on the assumption that there had been "some overlap" 163 in the taxation of the taxpayer's income. Because it was
unwilling to hold that the commerce clause shielded taxpayers from
multiple taxation resulting from the application of different formulas,
it rejected that claim as well.
Although Moorman can be read as endorsing the view that a taxpayer must show actual multiple taxation to sustain its claim under
the commerce clause, the case is more appropriately viewed as establishing the proposition that the commerce clause simply does not forbid every form of multiple taxation - whether potential or actual. To
return to the point with which we commenced this article, when the
risk or actuality of multiple taxation is a function of the application of
two internally consistent formulas, it is constitutionally tolerable
within broad limits.164
This conclusion is supported by the three decisions succeeding
Moorman prior to the Court's formal embrace of the "internal consistency" principle. In its 1979 opinion in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 165 a case in which the state tax created multiple taxation
in fact, the Court declared that "we have no occasion here to decide
under what circumstances the mere risk of multiple taxation would
invalidate a state tax." 166 A year later, however, in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 167 the Court squarely confronted that question. In Mobil Vermont sought to tax an apportioned share of the
taxpayer's dividend income from its unitary business being conducted
162. 437 U.S. at 276.
163. 437 U.S. at 277.
164. See text at notes 12-17 supra; Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 184 (1983) (duplicative taxation of fourteen percent of taxpayer's income "within the substantial margin of error inherent in any method of attributing income among the components of a
unitary business").
165. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
166. 441 U.S. at 452 n.17 (emphasis in original).
167. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
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in part in Vermont. Mobil maintained that Vermont's claim to an
apportioned share of its dividends threatened to expose more than
100% of its income to state taxation because of the asserted power of
New York, the state of Mobil's commercial domicile, to tax all of Mobil's dividends on an unapportioned basis. Since New York did not in
fact tax the dividends at issue, Mobil was subjected only to a risk of
multiple taxation, and the Court therefore had to face the question
whether proof of actual - not merely potential - multiple taxation
was a prerequisite to establishing a violation of the commerce clause.
In Mobil, the Court unequivocally put .its imprimatur upon the
"risk" theory of the multiple taxation doctrine. It agreed with Mobil
that "the constitutionality of a Vermont tax should not depend on the
vagaries of New York tax policy." 168 And it rejected the state court's
contention that actual multiple taxation mtist be demonstrated to
make out a case under the commerce clause. 169 A few months after its
decision in Mobil, the Court reiterated its commitment to the "risk"
theory of multiple taxation in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue. 170 Exxon asserted that the power of Wisconsin to tax an
apportioned share of its exploration and production income subjected
that income to the risk of multiple taxation because of the alleged
power of the states where the exploration and production occurred to
tax all of such income. As in Mobil, the Court in Exxon entertained
this claim despite its explicit recognition that "it is the risk of multiple
taxation that is being asserted" 171 and that "actual multiple taxation
has not been shown."112
In sum, the Court's "long tradition" of considering allegations of
multiple taxation does reflect a willingness to consider "abstract" or
"hypothetical" claims in adjudicating the validity of state taxes. The
question remains, however, whether Justices Rehnquist and Scalia are
right as a matter of principle in objecting to the "internal consistency"
doctrine because it dispenses with the requirement that a taxpayer in
fact be burdened by the tax at issue.
The Court's approach appears justified for several reasons. First,
as the Court pointed out in Armco, "[a]ny other rule would mean that
the ~onstitutionality of West Virginia's tax laws would depend on the
168. 445 U.S. at 444.
169. On the merits, the Court sustained Vermont's position that it was entitled to tax an
apportioned share of Mobil's foreign source dividends derived from a unitary business being
conducted in part in Vermont. See generally Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 19.
170. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
171. 447 U.S. at 228 (emphasis in original).
172. 447 U.S. at 228.
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shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States, and that the
validity of the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the
particular other States in which it operated." 173 As a matter of principle, it is undesirable to fashion a rule of law that depends for its operation on the present configuration of the statutes of other states.
Second, even if acceptable as a matter of principle, it is undesirable as
a matter of practice. Taxpayers would face uncertainties in determining their state tax liabilities, states would face uncertainties in predicting state tax collections, and compliance and administration
difficulties would be exacerbated. Finally, even if otherwise acceptable, there is something unseemly about determining state tax liabilities
"on a first-come-first-tax basis." 174 Given the fundamental concerns
underlying the commerce clause, it would be perverse indeed to constitutjonalize a rule rewarding beggar-thy-neighbor state tax policies
with state tax collections depending on who won the race to the taxpayer's door.
C.

''Internal Consistency" and the Fair Apportionment Criterion

All of the taxes invalidated or imperiled by the "internal consistency" doctrine were unapportioned. Neither the business and occupation (B & 0) taxes struck down in Armco and Tyler Pipe, nor the flat
highway taxes struck down in Scheiner, nor the corporate qualification, business license, and other tax~ considered in Part II of this article, provided any mechanism for apportioning the tax measure to the
state by reference to the taxed activities being conducted there. Yet
the commerce clause has long required that a tax affecting interstate
commerce be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state. 175 Why, one may reasonably ask, did not the commerce
clause's fair apportionment criterion serve to dispose of the issues in
Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner, thus obviating recourse to the controversial "internal consistency" doctrine? The short answer is that it
did - or at least that it should have. The longer answer, which is an
extended one, may help explain why the Court ultimately invoked the
"internal consistency" principle rather than the fair apportionment re173. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984); see also Mobil, 445 U.S. at 444;
text at note 168 supra; Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1975); Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
174. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 458 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (overruled by Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987)).
175. See Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217, 228 (1891); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891); Hellerstein, State Taxation ofInterstate Business: Perspectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 57 (1987).
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quirement in striking down the levies in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and American Trucking Associations.
1.

The Fair Apportionment Criterion and Gross Receipts Taxes

It will be most fruitful to begin our discussion of this question with
Tyler Pipe, which squarely confronted the fair apportionment issue.
Although the Court in Tyler Pipe held that Washington's B & 0 tax
violated the "internal consistency" principle, 176 it nevertheless went
on to consider alternative challenges to the levy because of the possibility that the legislature could take remedial action that would cure
the constitutional defect the Court had identified. 177 The taxpayer had
argued that Washington's B & 0 tax violated the commerce clause
because it was not fairly apportioned to its activities in the taxing
state. The Court's entire treatment of the issue is contained in the
following paragraph:
Washington taxes the full value of receipts from in-state wholesaling or
manufacturing; thus, an out-of-state manufacturer selling in Washington
is subject to an unapportioned wholesale tax even though the value of the
wholesale transaction is partly attributable to manufacturing activity
carried on in another State that plainly has jurisdiction to tax that activity. This apportionment argument rests on the erroneous assumption
that through the B & 0 tax, Washington·is taxing the unitary activity of
manufacturing and wholesaling. We have already determined, however,
that the manufacturing tax and wholesaling tax are not compensating
taxes for substantially equivalent events in invalidating the multiple activities exemption. Thus, the activity of wholesaling - whether by an
in-state or out-of-state manufacturer - must be viewed as a separate
activity conducted wholly within Washington that no other State has
jurisdiction to tax. 178
The Court's disposition of the apportionment issue in Tyler Pipe
cannot be squared with its professed commitment to a commerce
clause jurisprudence based on the "practical effect" 179 of state taxes
and on "economic realities." 180 As the Court acknowledges, Washington's B & 0 tax on wholesaling indisputably includes receipts attributable in part to manufacturing activity earned on in other states.
Moreover, as Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent from General
Motors Corp. v. Washington, 181 which sustained Washington's B & 0
176. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
177. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2821. For a discussion of the Court's suggested "solution" to
the levy's "internal consistency" problem, see note 33 supra.
178. 107 S. Ct. at 2822.
179. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
180. 430 U.S. at 279.
181. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
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tax on wholesaling over the objection that it violated the fair apportionment criterion, 182
if commercial activity in more than one State results in a sale in one of

them, that State may not claim as all its own the gross receipts to which
the activity within its borders has contributed only a part. Such a tax
must be apportioned to reflect the business activity within the taxing
State. 183

Indeed, it is startling to find the Court more tolerant of an unapportioned levy measured by gross receipts that "affects each transaction in
proportion to its magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable
or otherwise" 184 than it would be of such a levy measured by net income that "does not arise at all unless a gain is shown over and above
expenses and losses, and . . . cannot be heavy unless the profits are
large." 185
The Court's only response in Tyler Pipe to these arguments, other
than to cite authority approving 186 but not satisfactorily justifying 187
unapportioned gross receipts taxes, was the bald assertion that the activity of wholesaling "must be viewed as a separate activity conducted
wholly within Washington that no other State has jurisdiction to
tax." 188 But this view of wholesaling as a "separate activity" that a
state can tax without apportionment because the activity "must be
viewed" as occurring "wholly within" the jurisdiction regardless of
the measure of the tax is a retreat into the very formalism that the
Court had purportedly abandoned in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady 189 and its progeny. The Court, after all, has told us on numerous occasions in recent years that these issues were to be decided on
the basis of practical economic realities, not on the formal distinction
between the subject and the measure of a tax. 190 Yet in Tyler Pipe, the
Court directly relied on that formal distinction - invoking the fact
182. Although the Court in Tyler Pipe overruled General Motors insofar as it sustained a levy
that violated the "internal consistency" principle, see text at notes 58·67 supra, it did not dis·
credit General Motors' disposition of the apportionment issue raised in the case.
183. General Motors, 371 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918); cf. Central
Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948) ("tax may constitutionally be sustained on
the [gross] receipts from the transportation apportioned as to the mileage within the State").
185. United States Glue Co., 247 U.S. at 329.
,
186. Tyler Pipe, 101 S. Ct. at 2822 (citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280-81
(1978) and Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 564 (1975)).
187. See Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 77, at 168-76 and text at notes 189-206

infra.
188. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2822.
189. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
190. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 614-17 (1981); Depart·
ment of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 743-48 (1978);
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 280-81.
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that the subject of the tax is local wholesaling - to avoid an inquiry
into the propriety of the measure of the tax, which concededly includes out-of-state values.
The critical point is that a tax levied upon interstate activity whether measured by gross receipts, net income, or other values must reflect the portion of the enterprise's activity that is being conducted in the taxing state, and the tax measure must be adjusted accordingly. Otherwise the state, under the guise of taxing some "local
incident" of that interstate activity, would be able to sweep into its tax
base gross receipts, net income, or other values that other states could
include in their tax bases with equal justification by identifying some
other "local incident" of that interstate activity. 191 The risk of multiple taxation to which such a regime would expose interstate commerce
is plain.
The Court has generally recognized this problem in the context of
taxes on interstate business activity measured by net income, property,
and other values, and it.has therefore required apportionment of those
values to reflect the taxpayer's activity in the taxing state, regardless of
whether the formal subject of the tax was some local privilege or
event. The question is why has it not done so in the context of taxes
on interstate business activity measured by gross receipts? The answer, as I have explained at greater length elsewhere, 192 seems to lie in
two considerations.
First, with respect to gross receipts taxes on interstate sales activity, the Court has analogized gross receipts taxes to retail sales and use
taxes. 193 Because retail sales and use taxes are consumer taxes which
are separately stated, collected from purchasers, and imposed on a
transaction-by-transaction basis, apportionment of such levies - in
the sense of division of the tax base - has never been viewed as a
practicable solution to the multiple taxation issues that such taxes
raise. 194 Instead, the Court in effect has had to decide whether the
191. See generally Strecker; "Local Incidents" of Interstate Business, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 69
(1957). This is not to suggest that states may never impose unapportioned taxes on "local"

subjects without burdening interstate commerce. They may do so if the tax base has no multistate attributes over which other states may properly assert their taxing authority. Hence there is
no need to apportion an ad valorem tax on real property nor a gross receipts tax on a local
massage parlor. But a tax measured by values generated by interstate activity is not immune
from the requirement of fair apportionment merely because it is framed as a tax on a distinctly
"local" event such as the privilege of engaging in local business.
192. Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 77, at 168-76. The ensuing discussion draws
freely from this article.
193. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 348 (1944).
194. Barrett, ''Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to State
Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 740, 755, 776 (1953); Kust & Sale, State Taxation of Interstate
Sales, 46 VA. L. REV. 1290, 1323-24 (1960).
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state from which the goods were sent, the state to which the goods
were shipped, or both, or neither would be permitted to tax retail interstate sales. 195 In fact, the Court has generally allowed the state of
destination to tax retail sales transactions while forbidding the state of
origin from doing so. 196 By analogy, the Court has generally sustained
gross receipts taxes on interstate sales activity when imposed by the
state to which the goods were shipped 197 while prohibiting such taxes
when imposed by the state from which the goods were sent. 198
Second, with respect to gross receipts taxes in general, the Court
for many years espoused the view that the states could impose excise
taxes on manufacturing, producing, and extracting activities measured
by the unapportioned gross receipts from those activities. 199 The
Court considered these activities to be "local" in nature, and it permitted the states to measure the value of the activities by the gross receipts they generated notwithstanding their intimate connection with
interstate activities.
The Court's failure to insist on an analytically sound apportionment solution in Tyler Pipe may thus be attributable to the existence of
two large bodies of supporting precedent that it saw no compelling
reason to disturb. Plausible explanations, however, must be distinguished from reasoned justifications. As suggested above, 200 there is
no theoretical justification for the Court's disposition of the apportionment issue in Tyler Pipe. Moreover, even the precedents that appear
at first glance to support the result in Tyler Pipe lose much of their
force upon closer examination. The cases that eschew apportionment
as an impractical (or unworkable) solution to the multiple taxation
issues raised by retail sales taxes have little bearing on the question
whether general business taxes imposed on interstate sales activity are
apportionable. Unlike retail sales taxes, general business gross receipts
taxes are neither separately stated nor imposed on a transaction-by195. See International Harvester, 322 U.S. at 358-62 (Rutledge, J., concurring and
dissenting).
196. See Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 77, at 172.
197. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (overruled by Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987)); Field Enterprises v. Washington, 352
U.S. 806 (1956) (per curiam), ajfg., 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955); International Harvester, 322 U.S. at 340; Allied Mills, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 318 U.S. 740 (1943) (per
curiam), affg., 220 Ind. 340, 42 N.E.2d 34 (1942).
198. See Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305
U.S. 434 (1939); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
199. See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919) (manufacturing);
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922) (extracting); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,
274 U.S. 284 (1927) (producing).
200. See text at notes 179-92 supra.
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transaction basis. Hence, the analogy the Court may have drawn between retail sales taxes and general business gross receipts taxes on
interstate sales activity is a false one insofar as the apportionment
question is concerned. Furthermore, the Court indicated in its 1981
opinion, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 201 that its earlier
precedents sustaining unapportioned gross receipts taxes on "local"
activities may no longer be good law. 202 The Court made it clear, at
least as a matter of principle, that gross receipts taxes affecting interstate commerce were subject to the same " 'consistent and rational
method of inquiry' " 203 it had applied to other taxes which focused on
" 'the practical effect of a challenged tax.' " 204 This " 'practical' analysis"205 requires, among other things, that a tax affecting interstate
commerce be "fairly apportioned.''206
2. Applying the Fair Apportionment Criterion to the Court's
''Internal Consistency" Cases
If the Court in Tyler Pipe had approached the apportionment issue
along the lines suggested by Justice Brennan's dissent in General Motors, 207 it would not only have met the objections set forth in the foregoing discussion, but it would also have resolved the multiple taxation
problem raised by Tyler Pipe without recourse to the "internal consistency" doctrine. An example demonstrates this is so.
.
Assume that there are three taxpayers, A, B, and C, each of which
201. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
202. In Commonwealth Edison, which involved a commerce clause challenge to Montana's
severance tax, the Court explicitly disapproved the rationale of Heisler and its progeny (including
Hope Natural Gas) that taxes on "local" activities were not subject to commerce clause scrutiny.
453 U.S. at 614-17. On the other hand, the Court approved the statement of the Montana
Supreme Court that there was no question in the case involving multiple taxation because " 'the
severance can occur in no other state' and 'no other state can tax the severance.' " 453 U.S. at
617.
203. 453 U.S. at 615 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443
(1980)).
204. 453 U.S. at 615.
205. 453 U.S. at 616.
206. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (quoted in Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 617). See also Shores, State Taxation ofInterstate Commerce - Quiet
Revolution or Much Ado About Nothing?, 38 TAX L. R.Ev. 127, 150 (1982) (arguing for application of apportionment principles to gross receipts taxes); Miers, The "Urban Severance Tax'~·
Some Questions as to Apportionment, 18 TULSA L.J. 359, 390 (1983) (suggesting apportionment
of severance taxes); cf. National Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 347, 215 N.W.2d 26
(1974), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 421 U.S. 940, 946 (1975) (tax on gross premiums of
insurance company struck down under due process clause because it was unapportioned); Indiana Dept. of Revenue v. P.F. Goodrich Corp., 260 Ind. 41, 292 N.E.2d 247 (1973) (gross income
tax could not' be applied to proceeds of a liquidation dividend received from an out-of-state corporation unless it was fairly apportioned).
207. See text at note 183 supra.
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has $100 of gross receipts from the wholesale sale of products it manufactures. Taxpayer A is an interstate business that manufactures products in Washington that it sells in other states, and its Washington
apportionment percentage, based on its average percentage of Washington property, payroll, and sales, is 67%.208 Taxpayer B is an interstate business that manufactures products in other states that it sells in
Washington, and its Washington apportionment percentage, based on
the same factors, is 33%. Taxpayer C is an intrastate business that
manufactures products in Washington that it sells in Washington, and
it has no right to apportion its income because its activities are wholly
intrastate. 209
If Washington's gross receipts tax had been applied on an apportioned basis to Taxpayers A, B, and C: there would have been no discrimination against interstate commerce and no possibility of multiple
taxation (beyond that which the Court has found tolerable under the
commerce clause). 210 Taxpayer A would have paid a manufacturing
tax on 67% of its gross receipts, the proportion that fairly reflected its
business activities in the state. Taxpayer B would have paid a wholesaling tax on 33% of its gross receipts, the proportion that fairly reflected its business activities in the state. Taxpayer C would have paid
a wholesaling tax on 100% of its gross receipts, the proportion that
fairly reflected its business activities in the state. The multiple activities exemption would be unobjectionable because it would simply relieve C: the local manufacturer/wholesaler, from paying a tax on
200% of its gross receipts from its commercial activity in the state.
Moreover, insofar as Taxpayers A or B engaged in both manufacturing
and wholesaling activity in the state, they too would benefit from the
multiple activities exemption which would assure that no more than
100% of the receipts from the activities fairly apportioned to the state
are taxed by the state.
In taxing only an apportioned share of the gross receipts from interstate manufacturing-wholesaling activity, Washington would thus
avoid creating an unconstitutional risk of multiple taxation. Other
states would likewise be free to tax a fairly apportioned share of the
gross receipts from interstate manufacturing-wholesaling activity attributable to activities in such states. These levies would be justified
under long-standing commerce clause doctrine sustaining apportioned
208. See note 19 supra.
209. A taxpayer engaged in business in only one state has no right to apportion his tax base.
See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEJN, supra note 13, at 422.
210. See text at notes 14-17 supra.
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taxes on interstate commercial activities without reference to their "internal consistency."
Furthermore, even if the "internal consistency" requirement was
applied to apportioned gross receipts taxes, it would be satisfied by the
formulas typically employed for apportioning net income.211 Nor
would the multiple activities exemption in Washington's (and in West
Virginia's) B & 0 tax raise any question of "internal consistency."
The apportionment of the tax measure - gross receipts - would insure that only a fair share of the tax base was being attributed to the
state, and the multiple activities exemption would serve the salutary
function of assuring that the same tax measure was not taxed twice to
the same taxpayer merely because the legislature had included it in the
tax base under two taxable subjects manufacturing · and
212
wholesaling.
Just as apportionment would provide a solution to the multiple tax
problem raised by Armco and Tyler Pipe without recourse to the "internal consistency" doctrine, so apportionment would provide a solution to the multiple tax problem raised by Scheiner without recourse to
the "internal consistency" doctrine. If the axle and marker fees had
been apportioned to the truck's activity in the state on the basis of instate miles to total miles or some other factor, the levies would have
created no commerce clause problem. Interstate trucks would have
paid only that portion of the fee that corresponded to the proportion
of their activity in Pennsylvania, and interstate commerce would have
suffered no discrimination or multiple tax burden. Moreover, as in the
case of apportioned gross receipts taxes, apportioned flat truck taxes
would satisfy the "internal consistency" requirement. If every state
imposed Pennsylvania's flat highway taxes, but apportioned them to
the mileage that the truck operated in the state, the interstate truck
would pay no more than the intrastate truck, although it would make
its payment to several jurisdictions.
In short, the commerce clause concerns of discrimination and multiple tax burdens that the Court addressed with the aid of the "internal
consistency" principle in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner could as easily have been dealt with by a rigorous application of traditional apportionment principles without mention of the phrase "internal
consistency." The Court's unwillingness to take seriously its·own re211. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-71 (1983); text
at notes 9-19 supra.
212. See Judson & Duffy, An Opportunity Missed: Annco, Inc. v. Hardesty, A Retreat from
Economic Reality in Analysis of State Taxes, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 723, 744-46 (1985) (criticizing
the Court's analysis of gross receipts taxes in Armco as "artificial" and arguing that the Court
should have required apportionment of the tax base).
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quirement that taxes be fairly apportioned may have created an environment in which some proxy for the fair apportionment criterion like "internal consistency" - would be invoked for the same purpose.
If a proper application of the fair apportionment requirement
would have invalidated the levies at issue in Armco, Tyler Pipe, and
Scheiner, it raises the question whether the Court's adoption of the
"internal consistency" principle makes any difference, except a semantic one. Insofar as the Court has refused in the past to insist on true
apportionment in cases like Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner, the application of the "internal consistency" rule does indeed make a significant difference in the outcomes of such cases and of others considered
in Part II. From a theoretical standpoint, however, it would appear
that an uncompromising application of the fair apportionment requirement to cases involving allegations of multiple taxation would in
most instances produce results essentially indistinguishable from the
application of the "internal consistency" principle. This conclusion
should not be surprising considering that the fair apportionment requirement and the "internal consistency" requirement are both
designed, at least in part, 213 to prohibit the same evil- multiple taxation of the interstate business. Perhaps, then, the "internal consistency" doctrine is not so "novel"214 or "revolutionary"215 after all, but
is merely another name for the fair apportionment requirement the
Court should have been insisting on all along.
There is, however, at least one multiple tax problem that escapes
solution under the "internal consistency" principle but is addressed by
a strict application of the fair apportionment requirement. As Justice
Scalia observed in his dissenting opinion in Tyler Pipe, although the
"internal consistency" principle condemns taxes if the adoption of the
same tax by other states would impose a multiple tax burden on the
multistate business, it does not deal with the problem of multiple taxation created by states imposing different taxes on the interstate enterprise. 216 Thus, as the "simplest example" of a valid, but cumulatively
burdensome levy, he points out that
[a] tax on manufacturing (without a tax on wholesaling) will have a discriminatory effect upon interstate commerce if another State adopts a tax
on wholesaling (without a tax on manufacturing) - for then a company
manufacturing and selling in the former State would pay only a single
tax, while a company manufacturing in the former [S]tate but selling in
213. The concerns of the fair apportionment requirement are not limited to multiple taxation. See text at notes 245-63 infra.
214. See text at note 140 supra.
215. See text at note 141 supra.
216. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2826 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the latter State would pay two taxes. 2 17
Justice Scalia regarded this as further evidence of the ill-considered
nature of the "internal consistency" doctrine because he saw "no reason why the fact that other States, by adopting a similar tax, might
cause Washington's tax to have a discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce, is of any more significance than the fact that other States,
by adopting a dissimilar tax, might produce such a result." 218
Because Justice Scalia shared the Court's view that apportionment
was an inappropriate solution to the problem raised by Washington's
B & 0 tax, 219 he did not consider the possibility that apportionment of
Washington's tax would solve the multiple tax problem he identified.
As suggested above, 220 a requirement that gross receipts taxes be apportioned would have assured that an interstate manufacturer/wholesaler's receipts would be divided between the manufacturing and
selling jurisdictions based on its activities in the state. The fact that
one state taxed the receipts under a manufacturing tax while the other
taxed them under a wholesaling tax would have no effect on the enterprise's tax liability. Thus, the problem identified by Justice Scalia
would disappear. 221
217. 107 S. Ct. at 2826.
218. 107 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis in original). United Engrs. & Constructors v. Rose, 363
S.E.2d 477 (W. Va. 1987) illustrates Justice Scalia's point. The taxpayer performed engineering
and design services outside of West Virginia in connection with a construction contract performed within West Virginia. The Court held, as a matter of state law, that all of the receipts
from the construction contract, which included payment for the engineering and design services,
were taxable under West Virginia's B & 0 tax as receipts from "contracting" performed in the
state. The court then turned to the taxpayer's claim that the West Virginia tax violated the
"internal consistency" requirement because the same engineering and design services taxed by
West Virginia would allegedly be taxed by the state where the services were performed, assuming, as "internal consistency" analysis requires, that the other state taxed "contracting" services.
On this assumption, the interstate contractor would be taxed twice on its engineering and design
services whereas its intrastate competitor would be taxed just once. The court rejected this argument on the ground West Virginia taxes design and engineering services only where the construction is being conducted, and that if every state adhered to such a scheme there would be no
multiple taxation in violation of the "internal consistency" requirement. 363 S.E.2d at 482-83.
If, however, another state imposed a "professional services" tax measured by receipts from all
professional services performed in the state regardless of where the services were ultimately used,
while West Virginia imposed a "contracting" tax measured by receipts from all contracts for
local construction regardless of where the services underlying the contract were performed, the
interstate enterprise would suffer a multiple tax burden on its receipts from engineering and
design services, even though its "internal consistency" claim would fall on deaf ears. Apportionment of the receipts from engineering and design services performed as a part of interstate commercial activity, on the other hand, would protect the interstate enterprise from a multiple tax
burden not borne by its local competitor. See text at notes 207-12 supra.
219. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2824-25; see text at note 40 supra.
220. See text at notes 207-12 supra.
221. Wholly apart from the possibility of apportionment as a solution to the problem Justice
Scalia has identified, one may question whether he has in fact identified a problem of discrimination under the commerce clause. It is true, as Justice Scalia points out, that if different states
employ different taxing schemes, some interstate firms will pay more tax than their intrastate
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* * * * * *

The foregoing discussion of the multiple activities exemption issues
raised by Armco and Tyler Pipe has proceeded on the assumption that,
with respect to manufacturing and wholesaling conducted by a single
taxpayer, the West Virginia and Washington B & 0 taxes were in substance a single levy applied to a single tax base; 222 that the multiple
activities exemption was designed to avoid taxing the same taxpayer
twice for engaging in closely related business activity; that the tax was
in no sense a value added tax imposed on separately identified gross
receipts representing manufacturing value, on the one hand, and
wholesaling value, on the other; and that essentially the same gross
receipts were included in the tax measure whether the levy was denominated a "manufacturing" tax or a "wholesaling" tax. This view
of the B & 0 taxes generally reflects their actual operation. 223
This view is not, however, the only one that may be taken of the
matter. If one adopts a more formalistic approach to the levies, as did
the Court in Armco and Tyler Pipe, and considers the tax on manufaccompetitors. However, interstate firms are not disadvantaged as such. Under Justice Scalia's
hypothetical, an interstate firm that manufactured in the state that taxes wholesaling and wholesaled in the state that taxes manufacturing would pay no taxes at all, and would thus enjoy an
advantage over its intrastate competitors in either state. Hence any disadvantage to the particular interstate firm from the two different taxing schemes would be adventitious. As noted above,
the Court has found such adventitious burdens resulting from states' different taxing schemes
constitutionally tolerable. See text at notes 14-17 and 161-64supra. These adventitious burdens
should be distinguished from the predictable burdens imposed on the interstate enterprise as such
as a result of the multiple activities exemptions at issue in Armco and Tyler Pipe. See text at
notes 222-31 infra.
222. Nothing in this or the preceding discussion should be read as suggesting that the state
must impose a single tax on manufacturing and wholesaling activity conducted by a single taxpayer. The discussion simply assumes that this is the way West Virginia and Washington were in
fact taxing manufacturer/wholesalers. As noted below, other assumptions are plausible, and
they require that the issues be analyzed within an analytical framework different from that constructed above.
223. Thus the measure of West Virginia's (subsequently repealed) tax on manufacturing was
"the value of the entire product manufactured," W. VA. CODE§ l l-13-2b (Supp. 1983) (repealed
1985), which was generally determined by "the gross proceeds of sales." W. Va. Business and
Occupation Tax Regulation§ 2.02(a), [Pre-July 1, 1987 Transfer Binder] [W. Va.] St. Tax Rep.
(CCH) ~ 68-810 (Dec. 29, 1982); the measure of West Virginia's tax on wholesaling was "the
gross income of the business," W. VA. CODE§ 1l-13-2c (1974) (repealed 1985), which meant the
"gross receipts of the taxpayer derived from ... sales and the value proceeding or accruing from
the sale of tangible property ..." W. VA. CODE§ 11-13-1 (1987). The measure of Washington's
tax on manufacturing was "the value of the products," WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.04.240
(Supp. 1988), which was generally determined by the "gross proceeds of sales." WASH. ADMIN.
CODE 458-20-112 (1983); the measure of Washington's tax on wholesaling was the "gross proceeds of sales." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.04.270 (Supp. 1988). In short, the measure of
both the manufacturing and wholesaling taxes in West Virginia and Washington was generally
gross proceeds or receipts from sales, although the measure of the manufacturing tax on out-ofstate sales could be reduced to reflect out-of-state transportation costs. W. Va. Business and
Occupation Tax Regulation§ 2.03(b), [Pre-July l, 1987 Transfer Binder] [W. Va.] St. Tax Rep.
(CCH) ~ 68-810 (Dec. 29, 1982); WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 458-20-112 (1983). All this may simply attest to the fact that manufacturers typically generate gross receipts by selling at wholesale.
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turing and the tax on wholesaling as two separate exactions on discrete
activities, even when carried on by the same taxpayer, 224 then the preceding analysis of the multiple. activities exemption problem, with its
emphasis on apportionment as the proposed solution, is not wholly
satisfactory. If the manufacturing and wholesaling taxes are perceived
as two independent levies, a multiple activities exemption could discriminate against interstate commerce despite the fact that both taxes
are fairly apportioned. Because the exemption from a fairly apportioned gross receipts tax on manufacturing would be available to the
taxpayer only insofar as it had fairly apportioned receipts from wholesaling, and because exemption from a fairly apportioned gross receipts
tax on wholesaling would be available to the taxpayer only insofar as it
had fairly apportioned receipts from manufacturing, the multiple activities exemption would create an incentive for the taxpayer to conduct its manufacturing activities where it conducted its wholesaling
activities. 225
The vice of such a scheme was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Maryland v. Louisiana, 226 where it struck down a tax on Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) gas used in Louisiana because, among other things,
the tax could be credited against Louisiana severance tax liability:
"The obvious economic effect of this Severance Tax Credit is to encourage natural gas owners involved in the production of OCS gas to
invest in mineral exploration and development within Louisiana rather
than to invest in further OCS development or in production iri other
States."227 The levy therefore violated the commerce clause principle
forbidding state taxing measures that "foreclos[e] tax-neutral deci224. When manufacturing and wholesaling activities are conducted by different tiptpayers,
the B & 0 levies clearly tax the two activities separately. It is only when manufacturing and
wholesaling activities are conducted by a single taxpayer that one can argue that the B & 0 tax
effectively subjects the activities to a single levy. The multiple activities exemption therefore
discriminates in favor of vertically integrated enterprises, which will pay only one tax on manufacturing or wholesaling, and against independent manufacturers and wholesalers which will
collectively pay two such taxes. But such discrimination does not implicate commerce clause
concerns. See Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (sustaining, over commerce clause objections, regulation discriminating against vertically integrated oil companies).
225. For example, assume that every state imposed a fairly apportioned gross receipts tax on
both manufacturing and wholesaling activity conducted within the state, with an exemption from
the manufacturing tax insofar as the gross receipts were taxable under the wholesaling tax. Only
those taxpayers who conducted all their manufacturing and wholesaling activities in a single
state, or who conducted their manufacturing activities in precise proportion to their wholesaling
activities in particular states, would enjoy the full benefit of the exemption. Taxpayers whose
wholesaling activities did not precisely correspond on a geographical basis to their manufacturing
activities would lose the benefit of the exemption insofar as taxable receipts from wholesaling
were unavailable to reduce the gross receipts taxable under the manufacturing tax.
226. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
227. 451 U.S. at 757.
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sions" 228 by "providfug a direct commercial advantage to local business"229 and thereby inducing taxpayers to conduct in-state
activities. 230
More fundamentally, the problem with the multiple activities exemption, viewed in the context of two separate exactions imposed on
two independent taxable activities, is that it provides relief from the
tax on o~e activity based on the carrying on in the state of the other.
Such a scheme creates an incentive for taxpayers to consolidate their
activities in a single state so as to minimize their aggregate tax burden,
at least if one assumes, along with "internal consistency" analysis, that
every state has adopted a similar taxing regime. However, apportionment does not completely solve this problem. Apportionment addresses the problem of overtaxation that arises when a state seeks to
tax more than its appropriate share of a tax base to which other states
may lay a legitimate claim. It does not address the problem of
undertaxation that arises when a state relinquishes its claim to its
usual share of a tax base because the taxpayer engages in additional
local activity.
Apportionment therefore may be regarded as less than a panacea
to the multiple activities exemption problem if one views the manufacturing and wholesaling taxes imposed on taxpayers engaged in both
activities as two distinct levies. Such a conclusion, however, does not
ipso facto justify the Court's invocation of the "internal consistency"
principle to invalidate the exemptions. When the effect of a state levy
is to "undertax" local activity vis-a-vis interstate commerce, the
Court's commerce clause precedents provide ample authority to invalidate such taxes without recourse to the "internal consistency"
principle. 231
3.

''Internal Consistency," Fair Apportionment, and Tax Credits

A final piece in the "internal consistency" mosaic that warrants
brief attention is the impact of tax credits on the constitutional analysis. A tax that appears to be internally inconsistent will nevertheless
228. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comrnn., 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
229. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
230. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984) (invalidating tax credit
that induced taxpayers to conduct export-related activity within state); Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963) (invalidating sales-use tax scheme that induced tax·
payers to assemble equipment within state).
231. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 400 ("undertaxation" of those engaged in local export-related activity where larger tax credit was provided for shipping activities conducted in
New York); Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 331 ("undertaxation" of those selling stock in
New York state).
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pass the "internal consistency" test if the taxing state grants a credit
for taxes paid to other states on the same tax base. For example, a flat
highway tax, though internally inconsistent on its face, will pass the
"internal consistency" test if the taxing state grants a credit for flat
highway taxes imposed by other states. If such a taxing scheme were
in force in every state, the interstate trucker, like his intrastate competitor, would pay a tax to only one state, and he would receive a
credit against that tax in other states in which he operated. 232 The
crediting device thus shields the interstate business from the risk of
multiple taxation that the "internal consistency" doctrine was
designed to prevent. 233
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this point in Tyler Pipe.
It observed that Washington could eliminate the interstate enterprise's
exposure to multiple taxation of receipts generated by wholesaling and
manufacturing by granting local manufacturers a credit against Washington manufacturing tax liability for wholesale taxes paid to other
states and by granting out-of-state manufacturers a credit against
Washington wholesaling tax liability for manufacturing taxes paid to
other states. 234 A similar point can be made with regard to the credit
that most states provide against their use taxes for sales or use taxes
paid to other states.235 Citing Tyler Pipe, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Goldberg v. Johnson 236 likewise declared that the provision of a
credit against the state's telecommunications excise tax "cures any
possible constitutional infirmity resulting from multiple taxation." 237
If a credit against state tax liability for taxes paid to other states on
the same tax base generally eliminates the risk of multiple taxation,
and with it the claim of internal inconsistency, the question remains
232. This assumes that every state has imposed a fiat tax of the same magnitude and that the
states have employed consistent rules for allowing credits against other states' taxes. Although
this assumption is appropriate for purposes of "internal consistency" analysis, which contemplates the replication of the challenged state's tax by other states, as a practical matter states' fiat
highway taxes will vary in amount and differing crediting schemes can produce multiple taxation
of the interstate business. See note 118 supra.
233. Although true as a matter of principle, inconsistent crediting schemes can in practice
result in multiple taxation. See note 118 supra.
234. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2819-21; see note 33 supra. The Court made an analogous point
in Scheiner with regard to registration fees. Because every state recognizes the registration of
every other state, the payment of a registration fee to one state - even though fiat and unapportioned - does not impose a multiple tax burden on the interstate truck: "Having paid one registration fee, a vehicle may pass among the States as freely as it may roam the State in which it is
based .•.. " 107 S. Ct. at 2840. In substance, the registration reciprocity provisions operate like
credits.
235. See text at notes 117-20 supra.
236. 117 ID. 2d 493, 512 N.E.2d 1262 (1987) (per curiam), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Goldberg v. Sweet, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988). The case is considered further at notes 251-63 infra.
237. Goldberg. 512 N.E.2d at 1267.
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whether a credit similarly disposes of objections to a levy on fair apportionment grounds. The Vermont Supreme Court gave an affirmative answer to this question in sustaining a use tax measured by the
full, unapportioned purchase price of a corporate aircraft, even though
only 17% of the aircraft's flight time was attributable to Vermont. 238
In response to the taxpayer's claim that the use tax had to be apportioned to the aircraft's activities in Vermont, the court declared:
Two methods of taxation have been developed to ameliorate the risk of
cumulative tax burdens upon interstate transactions. First, ... multiple
taxation may be avoided by a tax credit which provides an offset or exemption if a sales or use tax has been paid to another state or jurisdiction. Second, the tax burden may be apportioned ....
The Commerce Clause does not require apportionment in addition to
a tax credit. The rule of Complete Auto [Transit, Inc. v. Brady239] requiring a tax on interstate commerce to be "fairly apportioned" is satisfied here. The state has provided a tax credit in lieu of apportionment.
This credit, not unlike a proportionate tax, eliminates the possibility of
cumulative use tax liability. 240

Opinions from other state tribunals share the Vermont court's view
that the availability of a credit against other states' taxes obviates the
need for apportionment. 241 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently remarked in passing that a credit satisfies the fair apportionment requirement: "The Louisiana taxing scheme is fairly
apportioned, for it provides a credit against its use tax for sales taxes
that have been paid in other States. " 242
The problem with the position advanced by the Vermont court is
not that it reached the wrong result in the case before it. As noted
above, 243 apportionment of the tax base has never been regarded as a,
practicable solution to the multiple taxation issues raised by retail
sales and use taxes like the levy at issue in the Vermont and kindred
238. Frank W. Whitcomb Constr. Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 144 Vt. 466, 479 A.2d
164 (1984).
239. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
240. Whitcomb Constroction, 144 Vt. at 471, 473, 479 A.2d at 167-68.
241. Director of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., 734 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo. 1987);
K.SS Transp. Corp. v. Baldwin, 9 N.J. Tax 273, 287 (1987); H.K. Porter Co. v. Commonwealth,
534 A.2d 169, 171 (Pa. Commw. Ct.1987).
242. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 108 S. Ct. 1619, 1623 (1988). In Holmes, the Court
upheld, over commerce clause objections, the application of Louisiana's use tax to a retailer's
customers in the state. The Court's comment regarding apportionment, in general, and the rela·
tionship between apportionment and credits, in particular, was dictum because the taxpayer
raised no issue of unfair apportionment in the case. See Brief for Appellant, D. H. Holmes Co. v.
McNamara, 108 S. Ct. 1619 (1988) (No. 87-267).
243. See text at notes 194-99 supra.
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cases. 244 In such cases, a crediting scheme may be the only feasible
method of avoiding multiple taxation. Insistence on true apportionment, in the sense of division of the tax base among the states that
have a substantial connection with the interstate activity that generates the tax base, could create administrative chaos in the enforcement
of retail sales and use taxes.
The problem with the position advanced by the Vermont court is
rather that it equates the fair apportionment requirement with the proscription against multiple taxation when in fact the fair apportionment
requirement is not so confined. To be sure, the fair apportionment
requirement precludes multiple taxation within certain limits,245 and
tax credits achieve the same objective. But our acceptance of tax credits as a practical solution to the multiple tax problems raised by sales
and use taxes should not blind us to the fact that an unapportioned tax
remains an unapportioned tax regardless of whether it is offset by a
credit.
Retail sales and use taxes are generally unapportioned. 246 There is
no more justification in principle for a state taxing the unapportioned
gross receipts from an interstate retail sale - i.e., a sale of goods
shipped from a seller in one state to a purchaser in another - than
there is for a state taxing the unapportioned gross receipts from other
interstate business activity. 247 In both cases "commercial activity in
more than one State results in a sale in one ofthem,"248 and there is no
reason why the state of origin 'or the state of destination may "claim as
all its own the gross receipts to which the activity within its borders
has contributed only a part."249 In relying on credits as a remedy to
244. All the cases cited in note 241 supra involved retail use taxes on corporate aircraft. See
also Service Merchandise Co. v. Jackson, 735 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tenn. 1987); Great Arn. Airways
v. Nevada State Tax Commissioner, 101 Nev. 422, 426-28, 705 P.2d 654, 657-58 (1985) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 74 (1986) and Miller v. Commissioner of Revenue, 359 N.W.2d
620, 622 (Minn.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985), where the courts indicated that retail use
taxes need not be apportioned.
245. See text at notes 12-17 supra.
246. Some states apportion retail sales and use taxes imposed on purchases of vehicles and
parts by interstate transportation companies. See FLA. STAT. §§ 212.08(8)-.08(9) (1987); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 297A.212 (West Supp. 1988).
247. See text at notes 175-206 supra for the argument that states should be required to apportion gross receipts on interstate business activity.
248. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 451 (1964) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
249. General Motors, 377 U.S. at 451; see also International Harvester Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 358-62 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (undue burden of cumulative
taxation exists in the absence of a credit or apportionment). It is true that Justice Brennan,
before penning the words quoted in the text, did declare that "[o]f course, when a sale may be
localized completely in one State, there is no danger of multiple taxation, and, as in the case of a
retail sales tax, the State may use as its tax base the total gross receipts arising within its borders." General Motors, 377 U.S. at 450. Moreover, this view that there are wholly "local" events
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the multiple taxation problem raised by unapportioned sales and use
taxes, it should be noted that the grant of a credit does not make the
tax fairly apportioned and that credits are no more than a second-best
alternative, compelled by administrative considerations, to the fair apportionmnent of a tax base.
The reason why it is important not to confuse a credit with the
apportionment of a tax base is that the fair apportionment requirement
is directed at broader concerns. Wholly apart from its role in preventing multiple taxation, the fair apportionment criterion serves to limit
the territorial reach of state power by requiring that the state's tax
base corresponds to the taxpayer's in-state presence. 250 A credit
designed to avoid the risk of multiple taxation may not satisfy the fair
apportionment requirement - at least in cases in which apportionment is administratively practicable.
This distinction is well illustrated by Goldberg v. Johnson, to which
this article alluded briefly above2 51 and in which the Supreme Court
has noted probable jurisdiction.252 Goldberg involved a commerce
clause challenge to Illinois' telecommunications excise tax, which is
imposed on the "act or privilege of originating or receiving interstate
telecommunications" in the state at the rate of five percent of the
unapportioned gross charge for such telecommunications. 253
Although the levy appeared on its face to flunk the "internal consistency" test, 254 the Illinois Supreme Court, as noted above, held that
that may be taxed without apportionment is one to which the Court still adheres, at least in part.
Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2822 (1987); Common·
wealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981). See also text at note 178 and note 202
supra. As a matter of logic, however, the statement quoted in the text is as pertinent to a tax on
an interstate retail sale as to a tax on business activity measured by receipts from interstate
wholesale sales. Unless we are to be mesmerized by the labels to which the states attach to
exactions measured by receipts from interstate activities - and we have it on high authority that
we should not, see, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), there is no
reason in theory why the two levies considered by Justice Brennan should be treated differently
for purposes of the fair apportionment criterion.
250. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1968). This
aspect of the fair apportionment requirement is rooted in both the commerce and due process
clauses. 390 U.S. at 325 & n.5. See also note 11 supra.
251. See text at note 236 supra.
252. Goldberg v. Johnson, 117 ill. 2d 493, 512 N.E.2d 1262 (1987), prob. juris. noted sub.
nom. Goldberg v. Sweet, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988).
253. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2004, (1985), quoted in Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1265
(emphasis omitted).
254. In fact, the "internal consistency" issue was more complex than the provision quoted in
the text suggests. The tax only applied if the call was "charged to the taxpayer's service address"
in Illinois. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2002(b) (1985). Hence one could argue that the tax
was "internally consistent": if every state imposed such a tax, the interstate call would be taxed
no more than once - in the state of the taxpayer's service address. The Illinois court nevertheless found that the tax created "a real risk of multiple taxation ••• [because] at least two taxing
jurisdictions levy a tax similar to the instant tax ... in Illinois." Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1267.
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the availability of a credit against telecommunications taxes paid to
other states cured this apparent infirmity in the statute. 2 5 5
The fact that the availability of a credit may prevent multiple taxation, however, does not resolve the question of fair apportionment.
Unless one regards the fact that Illinois taxes only calls that are
charged to an Illinois service address256 as a form of apportionment an argument that even the Illinois Supreme Court did not advance, 257
it is difficult to contend that Illinois' telecommunications excise tax is
fairly apportioned to the commercial activity that generates the gross
receipts Illinois seeks to tax. Such activity is quintessentially interstate
- the transmission of telephone signals across state lines - and the
receipts it generates reflect activity both in Illinois and in other states.
Yet Illinois "claim[s] as all its own the gross receipts to which the
activity within its borders has contributed only a part."258 Insofar as
the Illinois Supreme Court sought to justify the levy on the ground
that it was imposed on a local "taxable event," 259 it smacks of the
formalism that the Court has discarded and replaced with a commerce
clause jurisprudence rooted in practical economic reality. 260 And insofar as the Illinois court sought to justify the levy on the ground that
the credit precluded multiple taxation, 261 its argument was essentially
a non-sequitur that fails to respond to the underlying claim of unfair
apportionment.
There may well be a case to be made for the Illinois Supreme
Court's refusal to confront the apportionment issue, apart from an invocation of Supreme Court precedents such as Tyler Pipe that likewise
fail to dispose of the fair apportionment issue in an analytically defensible manner. 262 Conceivably, apportionment of Illinois' telecommunications excise tax is no more feasible as a practical matter than
apportionment of retail sales and use taxes. If this were true, then
failure to require true apportionment, and reliance on the credit as a
means of avoiding multiple taxation, may be an acceptable bow to the
The Court's reliance on the crediting provision of the tax as an answer to the multiple taxation
claim, see text at note 237 supra, implies that it did not believe the levy was "internally consistent" without the credit.
255. Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1267; see text at note 237 supra.
256. See note 254 supra.
257. Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1266 ("it is not an apportioned tax").
258. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 451 (1964) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
259. Goldberg, 512 N.E.2d at 1266.
260. See text at notes 201-06 supra. But see note 249 supra.
261. 512 N.E.2d at 1267.
262. See text at notes 176-206 supra.
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same administrative considerations that underlie the commerce clause
principles governing retail sales and use taxes. This is not an argument on which the Illinois Supreme Court relied, however, in reaching
its conclusion. Nor is it one that is particularly persuasive in light of
the fact that other states apportion their taxes on interstate
telecommunications. 263
IV.

CONCLUSION

We come finally to the question to which the title of this article
seems to promise a response - is "internal consistency" foolish? The
answer is "no," at least in terms of the fundamental commerce clause
policy underlying the "internal consistency" principle, namely, that
interstate business should not be subject to additional tax burdens
merely because it engages in commercial activity across state lines. On
the other hand, the Court did not need to invoke the doctrine of "internal consistency" in striking down the unapportioned levies in
Armco, Tyler Pipe, and Scheiner. It could have invalidated them
under a straightforward application of the venerable fair apportionment requirement. Had it taken this course, it might have "clear[ed]
up the tangled underbrush of past cases"264 and made a positive contribution to the Court's modem commerce clause jurisprudence. Instead, the Court has embraced a doctrine of "internal consistency"
that may introduce confusion and uncertainty in an area of the law
that has had more than its fair share of both.

263. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(e)2c (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-56(C) (1986) (effective through July 1, 1988); VA. CoDE § 58.1-2623 (Supp. 1988) (repealed effective 1990 tax
year). In any event, the Supreme Court will provide us with the final word on these and other
issues raised by Goldberg when it renders its decision in the case during its October 1988 Term.
264. Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 612 (1951) (Clark, J., dissenting).

